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What Good Is Religious Freedom? 
Locke, Rand, and the Non-Religious Case for 
Respecting It 
 
Tara Smith∗ 
 
“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, 
it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of 
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith 
therein.”  Justice Robert Jackson1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Religious freedom is in the limelight.  In recent years, 
religiously inspired violence has slaughtered thousands around 
the world and provoked calls for the repression of adherents of 
various faiths.2  Domestically, we have shrill debates:  Should 
bakers be compelled to serve at gay weddings when they have 
religious objections to doing so?3  Should government officials 
be compelled to facilitate gay marriages when they have religious 
 
       ∗ I am grateful to Onkar Ghate, Steve Simpson, Greg Salmieri, Robert Mayhew, and 
Kevin Douglas for helpful discussion as I formulated many of the ideas addressed in the 
paper, and to my Research Assistants Sam Krauss, Simone Gubler, and Zach Blaesi. 
1.  W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (Jehovah’s 
Witnesses objected to compulsory Pledge of Allegiance).  
2.  Tom Heneghan, Religious Violence Across World Hits Six Year High According to 
Pew Study, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 23, 2014), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/14/religious-violence-pew-
survey_n_4596169.html [https://perma.cc/8QLS-J89X]. 
3.  See John Corvino, “Bake Me a Cake”: Three Paths for Balancing Liberty 
and Equality, WHAT’S WRONG? THE NOT QUITE OFFICIAL BLOG OF CU-BOULDER’S CTR. 
FOR VALUES & SOC. POL’Y (Oct. 15, 2015), 
https://whatswrongcvsp.com/2015/10/15/guest-post-from-john-corvino-bake-me-a-cake-
three-paths-for-balancing-liberty-and-equality/ [https://perma.cc/F4Z6-8XPE] (concerning 
Sweet Cakes by Melissa, a bakery in Oregon that was fined for refusing to bake a wedding 
cake for a gay couple, in violation of the state’s equality laws); Eric Eckholm, Baker Who 
Denied Cake to Gay Couple Loses Appeal, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2015, at A15 (describing 
a similar case in Colorado). 
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objections to doing so?4  Should employers have to provide 
workers with medical insurance for practices that they disapprove 
of on religious grounds?5  Prayer at town meetings,6 zoning 
exemptions for church property,7 embryonic stem cell research,8 
workplace dress codes,9 beards on prisoners,10 recognition of 
religious organizations at state universities11—a stream of 
contentious battles seems to pit religious freedom against equal 
protection.12  The liberation of some, many charge, is coming at 
the expense of others (e.g., his freedom to marry versus her 
freedom to practice her faith).  Each side digs in—some with 
lawsuits, others with legislation.  In 2015 alone, eighty-seven 
religious refusal bills were introduced in twenty-eight states.13 
The aim of this paper is to step back from these controversies 
so as to consider the larger value at stake.  Its question:  What 
 
4.  See Alan Blinder and Richard Perez-Pena, Kentucky Clerk Defies Justices on 
Marriages, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2015, at A1.  
5.  See Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1559 (2016); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014).  
6.  See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1815 (2014).  
7.  See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) of 2000, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2012); Jess Bravin, Church Turns to Higher Authority in Zoning Battle, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2011, at A1. 
8.  Federal funding for such research was cut back, amidst controversy, by President 
George W. Bush.  See Mark Hanson, Religion and Stem Cell Research, U. OF MONT.: CTR. 
OF ETHICS, http://www.umt.edu/ethics/imx/radioessays/comment_religionandstemcells.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ESQ3-DF6J]. 
9.  EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2031 (2015); Mitchell v. McCall, 
143 So. 2d 629, 630 (Ala. 1962).  
10.  Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859 (2015); cf. Fraternal Order of Police Newark 
Lodge # 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 360 (3d Cir. 1999) (regarding a police 
department’s policy requiring officers to shave their beards); Tara Bahrampour, Police Force 
Eases Its Dress Code for Sikh Officers, WASH. POST, May 17, 2012, at B5 (regarding a 
Washington D.C. police department policy that allows officers to wear beards and religious 
headgear).  
11.  Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 668 (2010) (concerning Hastings 
College of Law); S. Alan Ray, How Religion and Rights Align on Campus, CHRONICLE OF 
HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 15, 2014, at A56.  
12.  These are merely a sample.  See generally CHRISTOPHER EISGRUBER & 
LAWRENCE SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2007) (discussing the 
conflicts that are created as freedom of religion is expanded); MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD 
VS. THE GAVEL: THE PERILS OF EXTREME RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (2d ed. 2014) (discussing 
the issues created by increasing religious liberty through the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act); Diana B. Henriques, As Exemptions Grow, Religion Outweighs Regulation, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2006, at A1 (discussing the expansion of protection for religious organizations 
at both the federal and state level). 
13.  Katherine Stewart, Ted Cruz and the Anti-Gay Pastor: Commentary, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 16, 2015, at A23. 
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good is religious freedom?  Why is it valuable?  What is the source 
of its goodness and what is the benefit of respecting it?  What 
does religious freedom add to a properly governed society? 
I am not a religious believer, yet I regard religious freedom 
as a critical component of a proper legal system.  What religious 
freedom is, however, is widely misunderstood in contemporary 
debate; it does not entail all of the protections that many profess.14  
My aim is to shed light on what religious freedom properly means 
and protects by examining its foundations.  Only with a sound 
understanding of these can we establish its scope and justly 
resolve the endless disputes over its application.  Basically, we 
cannot know what religious freedom protects until we know why 
it protects—the reasons for respecting religious freedom, in the 
first place.  Getting the foundations right is critical to getting the 
legal rights right. 
Unfortunately, the reigning accounts of religious freedom 
tend to be superficial and subjectivist.  The operative thinking, 
evidenced in perennial calls for “balance” and the increasing 
reliance on exemptions,15 is roughly the following:  “Different 
people want different things and there’s no getting them to agree.  
We should accept that as our starting point and simply work out 
reasonable compromises to accommodate various parties’ 
demands.”  While it may seem easier to settle for such pragmatic 
solutions, in the long run, this approach actually diminishes 
religious freedom—and all freedom—for it treats individual 
rights not as inviolable claims, but as tokens for barter, with 
government simply coordinating the horse-trading.  The result is 
that no rights are secure. 
 
14.  For an argument against religious exemptions in particular, see generally Tara 
Smith, Religious Liberty or Religious License? Legal Schizophrenia and the Case Against 
Exemptions, 32 J.L. & POL. 43, 47-58 (2016) (arguing that religious exemptions destroy the 
impartiality of the legal system). 
15.  See Dahlia Lithwick, Conscience Creep: What’s so Wrong With Conscience 
Clauses?, SLATE (Oct. 3, 2013), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/10/is_there_a_princip
led_way_to_respond_to_the_proliferation_of_conscience.html [https://perma.cc/6D79-
84Y5]; Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity Based 
Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2518-19 (2015) 
(documenting the particular rise in claims seeking exemptions from laws requiring a person’s 
complicity in sin—as distinguished from direct commission of sin). 
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To understand the objective value of religious freedom, I 
will draw on the neglected insights of John Locke and others.16  
Although the Lockean defense has been sharply criticized and 
widely dismissed (notably, by Brian Leiter and Jeremy Waldron), 
it is actually quite instructive.17  While Locke’s argument is 
admittedly deficient in certain respects, it raises the kind of 
consideration that points to the truer foundations of religious 
freedom and, correspondingly, offers its most secure protection.  
The Lockean case revolves around the nature of human belief.18  
Essentially, it contends that belief cannot be physically coerced.19 
Building on Locke, I draw further on Ayn Rand’s 
explanation of rights to show that the problem is not that religion 
cannot be served by force, as the Lockeans lament (true though 
that is).  More deeply, force prevents autonomous reasoning and 
the attainment of knowledge—knowledge about any subject, 
religious or other.  What we will find, therefore, is that religion is 
not special, for the purposes of a proper legal system; it warrants 
no special treatment qua religion.  Religious freedom, however, 
is special; it is a vital right that must be respected.  My broader 
thesis is that religious freedom is valuable because intellectual 
freedom is valuable.  Intellectual freedom is valuable because it 
is the prerequisite of rational thought and human knowledge, 
along with all the further values that these make possible.  Thus 
respect for religious freedom is part and parcel of the proper 
respect of intellectual freedom, which is valuable for all of us, 
religious and non-religious alike. 
The plan is as follows.  In Part II, I will explain the Lockean 
argument20 on behalf of religious freedom.  Locke and others 
presented a mind-focused account of religious freedom.  That is, 
even while most of them were concerned to protect the religious 
 
16.  Their arguments are not entirely neglected.  See Ryan Pevnick, The Lockean Case 
for Religious Tolerance: The Social Contract and the Irrationality of Persecution, 57 POL. 
STUD. 846, 846-47 (2009). 
17.  See BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 10-12 (2013); Jeremy Waldron, 
Locke: Toleration and the Rationality of Persecution, in JUSTIFYING TOLERATION: 
CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 61-64 (Susan Mendus ed., 1988). 
18.  PETER J. STEINBERGER, THE IDEA OF THE STATE 154 (2004). 
19.  GLEN NEWEY, TOLERATION IN POLITICAL CONFLICT 108 (2013). 
20.  I will use “Lockean argument” to include others who share his basic view and not 
the views strictly of Locke alone.  I see Rand as broadly within this tradition, but because I 
also emphasize new extensions that Rand offered, I will later contrast her view with the first-
wave Lockeans.  Also, I use “freedom” and “liberty” interchangeably, throughout. 
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beliefs of a particular sect (such as Lutheranism or Anglicanism), 
their defense of religious freedom fastened on the mechanics of a 
person’s adoption of a religious belief rather than the content of 
particular creeds.  “How does a person come to believe 
anything?” they asked, “and what does that believing consist of?” 
In Part III, I will recount the reigning critique of the Lockean 
line.  Essentially, the critics contend that the Lockean portrait of 
belief and of coercion’s power to affect belief is naïve.  Religious 
dictators’ use of force is more effective than Lockeans appreciate. 
The core of my argument will come in Part IV as I respond 
to this critique by examining the deeper foundations of religious 
freedom.  This argument falls into three main segments.  First, 
and most substantially, I will draw on Rand to tease out precisely 
what the instruments of force can and cannot accomplish in 
influencing a person’s beliefs.  Second, given that many people 
cite the First Amendment as the source of religious freedom, I 
will consider the Amendment’s broader context and relation to 
the basic function of government to explain how these bear on 
freedom of the mind.  Finally, having seen the strong affinities 
between Locke’s and Rand’s arguments, I will underscore the 
ways in which Rand’s analysis develops and differs from the 
Lockeans’.  Doing so will sharpen our understanding of both and 
deepen our grasp of the value of religious freedom. 
Again, it is not only the religious who should be concerned 
with religious freedom.  Because religious freedom is simply one 
form of intellectual freedom, as we shall see, and because 
intellectual freedom is crucial to human well-being, we all have 
reason to understand the good of religious freedom. 
II.  THE LOCKEAN ARGUMENT: CONVICTION BY 
“LIGHT AND EVIDENCE” 
John Locke, along with several others before and since,21 
offered an important, vastly underappreciated defense of religious 
freedom.  The Lockeans argued that government should not seek 
to control people’s religious beliefs because doing so is 
impossible.22  Belief is not the kind of thing that force can 
manipulate.  A government rules through laws.  The physical 
means of law enforcement, however, (such devices as handcuffs, 
 
21.  I will name a few of the others shortly.  See infra Part II. 
22.  NEWEY, supra note 19. 
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clubs, guns, prison walls) are not capable of bringing about 
intellectual ends.  Physical means cannot deliver non-physical 
results.  Even if one considered it perfectly appropriate for a 
government to seek its members’ uniformity of religious belief, 
on the Lockean view, the attempt to achieve it by coercive means 
would be futile.23  Physical force simply cannot accomplish what 
religious dictators would like it to.24 
Locke contends, “It is only Light and Evidence that can work 
a change in Mens [sic] Opinions; which Light can in no manner 
proceed from corporal Sufferings, or any other outward 
Penalties.”25  It is in “the nature of the Understanding, that it 
cannot be compell’d to the belief of any thing by outward force.  
Confiscation of Estate, Imprisonment, Torments, nothing of that 
nature can have any such Efficacy as to make Men change the 
inward Judgment that they have framed of things.”26  
Consequently, a state-imposed belief would not truly be a belief 
for it would not be authentic.27  As Locke observes in his Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding, “[W]e may as rationally 
hope to see with other men’s eyes, as to know by other men’s 
understandings . . . . The floating of other men’s opinions in our 
brains, makes us not one jot the more knowing, [even if] they 
happen to be true.”28 
For a belief to be genuine, in other words, it must be “self-
authored” in a crucial respect:  the believer must affirm it because 
his mind regards certain evidence and inferences as 
demonstrating its truth.29  He might be mistaken about whether 
that reasoning does, in fact, logically warrant his conclusion.  The 
point here, though, is that in order for his belief to constitute a 
genuine belief (as opposed to the pretense of a belief), he must 
embrace it for reasons that make sense to him.  He must endorse 
 
23.  See id. 
24.  I will use “repressors,” “censors,” and “dictators” interchangeably to refer to all 
types of intellectual suppression by government, whether it specifically targets religion, the 
press, or wider forms of expression and intellectual activity.  I use “coercion” to refer to 
pressure imposed by physical force, whether actual or threatened.  
25.  JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 27 (James H. Tully ed., 
Hackett Publ’g Co. 1983) (1689) [hereinafter LOCKE, CONCERNING TOLERATION]. 
26.  Id. 
27.  For our purposes, I am using “state” and “government” interchangeably.  
28.  1 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 115 
(Alexander Campbell Fraser ed., Dover Publ’ns 1959) (1689). 
29.  TARA SMITH, AYN RAND’S NORMATIVE ETHICS: THE VIRTUOUS EGOIST 117, 
133-34 (2006) [hereinafter SMITH, THE VIRTUOUS EGOIST]. 
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the conclusion “by his own lights,” by his own independent 
logical reckoning.  The idea must stand on its merits, as far as he 
can tell, rather than on the say-so of someone else.30 
Locke also pointed out that the pretense of a religious belief 
would hardly fool a knowing god. 
Although the Magistrates Opinion in Religion be sound, 
and the way that he appoints be truly Evangelical, yet if I be 
not thoroughly perswaded thereof in my own mind, there 
will be no safety for me in following it.  No way whatsoever 
that I shall walk in, against the Dictates of my Conscience, 
will ever bring me to the Mansions of the Blessed.31 
Insincere professions of faith might keep a man out of trouble 
with Caesar, but they will not do him much good with the Lord.  
Thus anyone concerned with the actual condition of man’s soul 
should oppose attempts at its political manipulation. 
While Locke’s point is fairly straightforward, a different 
angle might deepen our grasp of its logic.  A government’s 
attempt to impose religious uniformity seeks to pressure a person 
into religious conviction—believe this, do that, or else. . . (or else 
some substantial penalty will be imposed).  Yet conviction is not 
susceptible to the types of pressures that a government can exert.  
Why not?  Because a person cannot acquire a conviction at will, 
by the sheer exertion of choice.32  A person can acquire many 
things in that way, of course.  He can get the glass on the top shelf 
by deciding to reach up and grab it; he can obtain a cup of coffee 
by placing his order and paying the cost; he can view the video 
“on demand” by clicking the appropriate tab on his tablet.  
Likewise, he can satisfy another person’s demands by deciding 
that the pressures exerted against him are greater than he chooses 
to bear:  That knife is now too frightening, so I’ll surrender my 
wallet; the interrogator’s threats of harm to my family are too 
great for me to risk, so I’ll divulge the information he wants.  
However effective threats of force might be for advancing certain 
 
30.  This is not to deny the wisdom of consulting with those who are more 
knowledgeable about certain subjects.  What is important is to maintain independence 
concerning who are credible experts and the degree of confidence to be placed in their 
counsel.  See id. 
31.  LOCKE, CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 25, at 38.  Coerced worship would 
be “Hypocrisie, and Contempt of his Divine Majesty.”  Id. at 26-27.  
32.  As philosopher Michael Lynch observes, “One does not simply will oneself to 
believe.  Rather, we pursue truth indirectly, by pursuing evidence that supplies us with 
reasons for belief.”  MICHAEL P. LYNCH, IN PRAISE OF REASON 125 (2012). 
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purposes, the problem is that a man cannot engage in the 
comparable calculation:  “the threatened penalty is more than I 
wish to bear; therefore, I believe in Jesus Christ.”  Belief does not 
work that way.  Because the kinds of factors needed to change a 
man’s beliefs “can in no manner proceed from corporal 
Sufferings,”33 as Locke puts it, it is pointless to try to induce 
beliefs by such means.  Force might entice a person to say that he 
believes a particular doctrine, but it cannot make him believe it.  
For outward conformity is merely that:  the observable imitation 
of some of the manifestations that typically accompany a 
particular belief.  It is not the real thing. 
Essentially, Locke argues by appeal to the basic difference 
in kind between reason and coercion.  As he observes, “[I]t is one 
thing to perswade, another to command; one thing to press with 
Arguments, another with Penalties.”34  The heart of Locke’s 
argument is that an unbridgeable gap prevents coercive means 
from advancing religious ends.  Because belief results only from 
“Light and Evidence,” religious belief is impervious to coercive 
manipulation.35 
Locke was not alone in detecting this obstacle to achieving 
religious belief through physical means.  In 1644, John Milton 
argued that “if [a man] believe[s] things only because his pastor 
says so, or the Assembly so determines, without knowing other 
reason, though his belief be true, yet the very truth he holds 
becomes his heresy.”36  Anticipating Locke, Milton held that 
“[w]hat matters is not outward conformity, but adherence to the 
inner light.”37  The man who asserts faith without understanding 
surrenders the “locks and keys” to his soul.38  Indeed, if a man 
professes a religious belief in order to comply with rulers’ 
coercive commands, what he believes in is actually the power of 
those men whom he obeys, rather than the divine object of their 
belief.39 
 
33.  LOCKE, CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 25, at 27.  
34.  Id.  
35.  Id.  
36.  JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA AND OF EDUCATION 37 (George H. Sabine ed., 
Harlan Davidson, Inc. 1951) (1644).  
37.  Andrew Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and the Establishment Clause, 50 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1831, 1851 (2009) (characterizing Milton’s view).  
38.  MILTON, supra note 36, at 38.  
39.  Id. 
2017] WHAT GOOD IS RELIGIOUS FREEDOM? 951 
Other thinkers employed similar reasoning.  Thomas Hobbes 
distinguished what the tools of the state could and could not 
accomplish:  “It is true, that if he be my Soveraign, he may oblige 
me to obedience, so, as not by act or word to declare I beleeve 
him not . . . .”40  What the sovereign cannot do, however, is have 
me “think any otherwise then my reason perswades me.”41  
Samuel Pufendorf maintained that “[i]t was not God Almighty’s 
pleasure to pull People head-long into Heaven, or to make use of 
the new French way of Converting them by Dragoons.”42  Since 
“truth could only be imparted by convincing arguments,” God left 
the choice of salvation in a man’s own hands.43  To exercise that 
choice, a man must be free.44  The contemporary scholar Susan 
Jacoby notes that, historically, attempts to coercively impose 
religion have merely produced a false uniformity that tended to 
collapse once a breath of freedom was permitted.45  Such a result 
is exactly what Lockean thinking would predict.46 
This line of reasoning resonated for many of the American 
colonists and Founding Fathers.  A prominent vein of their 
support for religious freedom was the concern that state 
involvement with religion would corrupt religion by the very 
means that Locke, et. al., had been calling attention to, namely, 
by corrupting beliefs’ authenticity and thus intruding on a man’s 
 
40.  THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 287 (W. G. Pogson Smith ed., Oxford Univ. Press 
1958) (1651).  
41.  Id. 
42.  SAMUEL PUFENDORF, OF THE NATURE AND QUALIFICATION OF RELIGION IN 
REFERENCE TO CIVIL SOCIETY 33 (Simone Zurbuchen ed., Jodocus Crull trans., Liberty 
Fund, Inc. 2002) (1687).  
43.  Koppelman, supra note 37, at 1861. 
44.  See PUFENDORF, supra note 42, at 77-78; Koppelman, supra note 37, at 1860-61.  
45.  SUSAN JACOBY, STRANGE GODS: A SECULAR HISTORY OF CONVERSION 413-14 
(2016).  Jacoby also suggests that attempts at forced conversion reveal a lack of confidence 
in the relevant religion’s persuasive power.  Id. at 414.  One would only resort to force if he 
believed that voluntary means could not lead to the assent of the forcibly manipulated.  Id. 
46.  The gradual “intellectualization” of religion over the centuries—the evolution of 
certain sects away from emphasis on piety and ritual toward a person’s intellectual assent to 
certain doctrines, alongside the shift from belief in select individuals as “chosen” and more 
toward the notion that an individual’s own choosing determines his relationship to god—
may have motivated greater attention to the mechanics of the mind’s operations.  That is, if 
a person’s own choices and beliefs are critical to the state of his soul, it becomes important 
to understand the conditions under which the salient choices and beliefs are truly possible.  
Further, the more that a man’s spiritual well-being was seen as his own responsibility rather 
than a matter of fate, the more reason he had to maintain the conditions that would allow him 
to fulfill that responsibility.  For an instructive discussion, see ANDREW KOPPELMAN, 
DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY 29, 136-138 (2013). 
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relationship with God.47  The Baptist minister Isaac Backus, for 
instance, argued that only a voluntary obedience could constitute 
true devotion.48  “As God is the only worthy object of all religious 
worship, and nothing can be true religion but a voluntary 
obedience unto his revealed will, of which each rational soul has 
an equal right to judge for itself, every person has an unalienable 
right to act in all religious affairs according to the full persuasion 
of his own mind, where others are not injured thereby.”49  Roger 
Williams, a renowned champion of religious freedom, insisted 
that authenticity was indispensable to salvation and that it could 
not be secured by force.50 
A carnal weapon or sword of steel may produce a carnal 
repentance, a show, an outside . . . uniformity through a state 
or kingdom . . .  [Yet], an unbelieving soul, being dead in 
sin . . . cannot please God; and, consequently, whatever such 
an unbelieving and unregenerate person acts in worship or 
religion, it is but sin.51 
A man might be induced to go through the motions of belief, 
Williams recognized, yet all that “the sword may make” is a 
“nation of hypocrites.”52  “[T]he straining of men’s consciences 
by civil power is so far from making men faithful to God or man 
that it is the ready way to render a man false to both.”53  Williams 
condemned any constraint of religious liberty as “soul rape,” his 
 
47.  See Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Messrs. Nehemiah Dodge and Others, a 
Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association, in the State of Connecticut (Jan. 1, 1802), in 
THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 510, 510 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984) [hereinafter 
Jefferson, Danbury Baptist Association]; James Madison, To the Honorable the General 
Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia: A Memorial and Remonstrance (June 20, 1785), 
in THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 298, 299 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973) 
[hereinafter Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance]; Isaac Backus, Draft for a Bill of 
Rights for the Massachusetts Constitution (1779), in ISAAC BACKUS ON CHURCH, STATE 
AND CALVINISM: PAMPHLETS, 1754-1789 app. 3 (William G. McLoughlin ed., 1968). 
48.  Backus, supra note 47.  
49.  Id.  
50.  See Koppelman, supra note 37, at 1855-56. 
51.  ROGER WILLIAMS, The Bloudy Tenent, in ROGER WILLIAMS, JOHN COTTON AND 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: A CONTROVERSY IN NEW AND OLD ENGLAND 87, 88 (Irwin H. 
Polishook ed., 1967) (1644) (This work was originally published in the same year as Milton’s 
Areopagitica).  
52.  Id. at 92.  
53.  ROGER WILLIAMS, The Bloody Tenet Yet More Bloody, in ON RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY: SELECTIONS FROM THE WORKS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 167, 195 (James Calvin 
Davis ed., 2008) (1652).  
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strong language being a reflection of his reverence for the sanctity 
of authentic conviction.54 
Concerned as some were to separate church and state in 
order to protect the purity of a man’s religious life, it is significant 
that many Founders who were not themselves committed to any 
particular religion (such as the Deists James Madison, Thomas 
Jefferson, and Thomas Paine) nonetheless staunchly defended 
religious freedom.55  For they saw its value as rooted in something 
deeper than the value of religion (an issue we will explore further 
in Part IV).56  Two of the First Amendment’s greatest champions 
employed Lockean, mind-based reasoning on its behalf.57 
Like Williams, Jefferson reasoned that “attempts to 
influence [the mind] by temporal punishments, or burthens, or by 
civil incapacitations, tend only to beget habits of hypocrisy and 
meanness.”58  Rulers’ attempts to assume “dominion over the 
faith of others” merely establish false religions.59  Madison 
likewise argued: 
“that Religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and 
the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason 
and conviction, not by force or violence.”  The Religion then 
 
54.  ROGER WILLIAMS, The Bloudy Tenet of Persecution, For Cause of Conscience, 
Discussed in a Conference Between Truth and Peace, in ROGER WILLIAMS: HIS 
CONTRIBUTION TO THE AMERICAN TRADITION 108, 142-43 (Perry Miller ed., 1965) (1644).  
Koppelman’s discussion of Williams and others (including Baptist minister John Leland, 
Congregationalist minister Elisha Williams, and Thomas Paine) is instructive.  See 
Koppelman, supra note 37, at 1854, 1862-63, 1869-71.  
55.  Koppelman, supra note 37, at 1863, 1866, 1870, 1874. 
56.  This accords with the (relatively) conceptual theory of language that the Founders 
employed.  As Evan Bernick discusses, the Founders were influenced by Locke’s portrait of 
words as referring to kinds, rather than to narrow particulars.  See Evan Bernick, Reason’s 
Republic, N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY, 2016 (forthcoming) (manuscript at 17-18) (on file at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2798715) [https://perma.cc/969V-
U2M2]. 
57.  While Jefferson is not as directly associated with specific constitutional provisions 
as are Madison and certain others, I call him one of the First Amendment’s champions based 
on Jefferson’s express commitment to the Constitution’s guiding principles as well as to 
freedom of thought, in particular, as evidenced in such writings as the Declaration of 
Independence and Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom.  See THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); VA. CONST. art. I, § 16.  Moreover, Jefferson coined 
the metaphor of a wall between church and state.  Jefferson, Danbury Baptist Association, 
supra note 47. 
58.  THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in THOMAS 
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 346, 346 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984). 
59.  Id.  Jefferson also observed that the effect of religious coercion has been “to make 
one half the world fools, and the other half hypocrites.”  THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON 
THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 160 (William Peden ed., 1954) (1785).  
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of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience 
of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it 
as these may dictate.  This right is in its nature an unalienable 
right.  It is unalienable, because the opinions of men, 
depending only on the evidence contemplated by their own 
minds cannot follow the dictates of other men.60 
Historically for over fifteen centuries, Madison observed, 
the effects of legal establishments of Christianity, far from 
serving the “purity and efficacy of Religion,” have begat only 
“pride and indolence in the Clergy, ignorance and servility in the 
laity, in both, superstition, bigotry and persecution.”61 
As instructive as I believe the Lockean reasoning for 
religious freedom is, its limitations are significant.  First, it is a 
narrow defense of religious freedom.  It argues against one 
particular rationale for government restriction of religion (albeit, 
a prominent one in its era), namely, the view that government 
coercion could “fix” a person’s convictions.62  Accordingly, at 
most, the Lockean argument would defeat that rationale for 
religious repression, but could not underwrite any wider 
foundation for religious freedom.  The more credence one thought 
that other defenses of repression might hold, therefore, the less 
potent the Lockeans’ overall contribution. 
More troublesome, Locke’s own understanding of 
“toleration” was severely limited.  He did not believe that 
religious freedom extended to Roman Catholics or to atheists, for 
instance.63  His reasoning was that Catholics and atheists both 
posed a threat to civil order; they could not be trusted to not 
interfere with the proper operations of government.64  In Locke’s 
 
60.  Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 47, at 298, 299.  The internal 
quotation is from George Mason’s Virginia Declaration of Rights, which had been adopted 
in June 1776.  VA. CONST. art. I, § 16. 
61.  Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 47, at 301. 
62.  Koppelman, supra note 37, at 1858-59. 
63.  Id. at 1859.  Not all in the Lockean tradition necessarily agreed with him, yet his 
views were hardly unusual in his era. Isaac Kramnick and R. Laurence Moore discuss the 
Test and Corporation Actions of 1673, for example, which would have required all civil and 
military office holders of the British crown to receive sacraments by the rites of the Anglican 
Church.  See ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION: A 
MORAL DEFENSE OF THE SECULAR STATE 78-79 (2005). 
64.  Locke writes, “Those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the Being of a God.  
Promises, Covenants, and Oaths, which are the Bonds of Humane Society, can have no hold 
upon an Atheist.  The taking away of God, tho but even in thought, dissolves all.”  LOCKE, 
CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 25, at 51.  In regard to Catholics’ devotion to Papal 
authority, “No Opinions contrary to human Society, or to those moral Rules which are 
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defense, note that this is the right kind of reason for denying 
rights—a person’s disruption of the government’s ability to fulfill 
its function.  That is, a government properly restricts, apprehends, 
or punishes people exactly when they are endangering others’ 
rights or obstructing the government’s efficacy in protecting those 
rights.  Thus, if certain people are known to pose such dangers, 
they would forfeit the usual legal rights.  The problem, however, 
is that evidence and logic do not vindicate Locke’s contention that 
atheists and Catholics do pose such a threat.  They are not known 
(and were not, even in Locke’s era) to create such disruptions.65 
The upshot is this:  The Lockean line of reasoning, by 
directing attention to the nature and conditions of thought 
formation, marks a major advance in our understanding of the 
value of religious freedom.  Nonetheless, this reasoning is 
imperfect and incomplete.  The critics we shall consider next, 
however, have not focused their attacks on these relatively 
peripheral shortcomings of the Lockean argument.  Rather, they 
challenge its central claim about the connection between thinking, 
believing, and freedom. 
III.  THE CRITICS’ DISMISSAL: WHAT FORCE CAN 
DO 
Jeremy Waldron and Brian Leiter, among others, argue that 
the Lockean portrait of the relationship between thought and force 
is simplistic.66  You can force a mind into embracing certain 
 
necessary to the preservation of Civil Society, are to be tolerated by the Magistrate.”  Id. at 
49.  “That Church can have no right to be tolerated by the Magistrate, which is constituted 
upon such a bottom, that all those who enter into it, do thereby, ipso facto, deliver themselves 
up to the Protection and Service of another Prince.  For by this means the Magistrate would 
give way to the settling of a foreign Jurisdiction in his own Country, and suffer his own 
People to be listed, as it were, for Souldiers against his own Government.”  Id. at 50.  
65.  See Jim Powell, John Locke: Natural Rights to Life, Liberty, and Property, FOUND. 
FOR ECON. EDUC. (Aug. 1, 1996), https://fee.org/articles/john-locke-natural-rights-to-life-
liberty-and-property/ [https://perma.cc/X5XL-E86W]; Adam Lee, If Peace on Earth is Our 
Goal, Atheism Might be the Means to that End, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 6, 2015), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jan/06/peace-on-earth-atheism 
[https://perma.cc/ZPY8-3633]. 
66.  See LEITER, supra note 17, at 10-12; Waldron, supra note 17, at 67-68, 85.  
Pevnick also criticizes this argument, although he contends that Locke has other resources 
by which to defend religious toleration.  See Pevnick, supra note 16, 847-48.  Because my 
focus is not on Locke per se but on the general line of reasoning he shares with others, I set 
aside such further discussion of Locke.  Whether or not Pevnick proves right in maintaining 
that Locke can offer stronger arguments for toleration, my arguments about the merits of his 
futility argument will be unaffected.   
956 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol.  69:943 
ideas.  Dictators successfully have, in numerous places:  Red 
China, the Soviet Union, Cambodia, Cuba.67  According to Leiter, 
history offers plentiful examples of societies in which the tyranny 
of the few is accepted by the many as desirable, showing that 
“states can successfully inculcate beliefs.”68  Indeed, dictators 
employ repression and propaganda precisely because they are 
effective.69  Millions of North Koreans believe the lies they are 
fed about Kim Jong Un, just as masses believed the lies they were 
fed about Mao or Stalin, or about Jews or other reputed state 
enemies.70 
Like it or not, Locke’s critics claim, repression works.  
Dictators censor, muzzle, and deny people access to vast streams 
 
67.  See Alex Newman, Communist Chinese Regime Forcing Rural Population Into 
Cities, THE NEW AM. (June 19, 2013), http://www.thenewamerican.com/world-
news/asia/item/15755-communist-chinese-regime-forcing-rural-population-into-cities/ 
[https://perma.cc/VR75-XBVU]; Thomas Skallerup, Historical Setting: 1917 to 1982, in 
SOVIET UNION: A COUNTRY STUDY 56, 68-71 (Raymond E. Zickel ed., 2d ed. 1991); 
Genocide in the 20th Century: Pol Pot in Cambodia 1975-1979, THE HIST. PLACE (1999), 
http://www.historyplace.com/worldhistory/genocide/pol-pot.htm [https://perma.cc/E5RM-
CJGP]; Lorenzo Canizares, Commentary: Cuba: What Went Wrong?, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
ANTI-REVOLUTIONISM ON-LINE (1983), 
http://www.historyplace.com/worldhistory/genocide/pol-pot.htm [https://perma.cc/M32F-
NKM3]. 
68.  LEITER, supra note 17, at 10-11.  
69.  The term “propaganda” is commonly used in at least two different ways.  
Sometimes, the term refers to information presented in a manner deliberately designed to 
foster its positive reception, although no coercion is involved.  A candidate’s political 
campaign or a product’s advertising campaign, for example, present their messages in ways 
crafted to elicit strong, favorable reactions.  Other times, “propaganda” refers to information 
that is managed by the government through such means as the silencing of critics, banning 
particular publications, shutting down websites, or the dissemination of government-created 
“information” to encourage people’s acceptance of certain ideas.  See Kenneth A. Osgood, 
Propaganda, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AM. FOREIGN POL’Y (2002), 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/political-science-and-
government/political-science-terms-and-concepts-62 [https://perma.cc/525H-XS8V].  
Regimes that repress religious freedom employ propaganda in the latter sense.   
70.  See Ian Birrell, “How Could our Country Lie so Completely?”: Meet the North 
Korean Defectors, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 27, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/global/2016/aug/27/north-korea-defectors-ian-birrell 
[https://perma.cc/4H5M-3K68]; Bao Tong, China: The Myth and the Lies of Mao Zedong 
still Oppress China, ASIANEWS.IT (Dec. 31, 2013), http://www.asianews.it/news-en/The-
myth-and-the-lies-of-Mao-Zedong-still-oppress-China-29929.html 
[https://perma.cc/W9Z4-UWTP]; Arnold Beichman, Tyrant’s Death Recalled: Why did 
Intelligent People Believe Stalin’s Lies?, WASH. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2003), 
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/858004/posts [https://perma.cc/3TAH-SCQ3]; 
Jane McGrath, 10 of the Biggest Lies in History, HOW STUFF WORKS (2016), 
http://history.howstuffworks.com/history-vs-myth/10-biggest-lies-in-history10.htm 
[https://perma.cc/L3RG-RNTR]. 
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of information.  The fact that dissidents persist and often produce 
impressive work while censored or imprisoned demonstrates that 
their minds are not incapacitated by the restrictions.  (Consider 
Fyodor Dostoyevsky under Tsars Nicholas I and Alexander II, for 
instance,71 or Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Joseph Brodsky in the 
USSR,72 or political dissidents such as Andrei Sakharov and 
Natan Scharansky.73)  Religious repressors often win wide 
compliance with their demands.  As Leiter sums it up, Locke 
simply “fail[ed] to appreciate the full complexity of the 
psychology and sociology of belief inculcation.”74  The Lockean 
argument, he contends, relies on a romanticized image of freedom 
that is out of touch with reality.75 
Waldron offers a more extended and more penetrating probe 
of the Lockean line, but its thrust is basically the same.  “Censors, 
inquisitors, and persecutors have usually known exactly what 
they were doing,” Waldron maintains, and thereby, have been 
able to manipulate their subjects’ beliefs.76  While the physical 
tools of coercion may not be able to reach every corner of a 
person’s thinking process or directly install a belief in a person’s 
mind in the same way that a surgeon can implant a chip in a skull, 
these tools can steer belief toward a dictator’s desired 
conclusions. 
Consider the portion of an individual’s thinking that may 
seem the least susceptible to external manipulation, his attention.  
Surely, one might suppose, whatever external pressures are 
applied against him, the individual can still direct or withhold his 
mental faculties from attending to various objects and ideas.  Yet 
 
71.  While Alexander was comparatively liberal and relaxed many of Nicholas’ 
repressive measures, his regime remained firmly autocratic and employed coercion to instill 
specific religious beliefs.  See ALEXANDER POLUNOV, RUSSIA IN THE NINETEENTH 
CENTURY: AUTOCRACY, REFORM, AND SOCIAL CHANGE, 1814-1914, 35 (Thomas C. Owen 
& Larissa G. Zakharova eds., 2005); NICHOLAS V. RIASANOVSKY, RUSSIAN IDENTITIES: A 
HISTORICAL SURVEY 168, 172 (2005); W.E. Mosse, Alexander II, ENCYCLOPEDIA 
BRITANNICA ONLINE (June 22, 2016) http://www.britannica.com/biography/Alexander-II-
emperor-of-Russia [https://perma.cc/T3C3-J8PX]. 
72.  See Keith Gessen & Masha Gessen, What Became of the Soviet Dissidents?, INST. 
FOR HUM. SCI. (2016), http://www.iwm.at/transit/transit-online/what-became-of-the-soviet-
dissidents/ [https://perma.cc/TG23-3Y6L]. 
73.  See Natalie Clifford Barney, Natan Sharansky, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA 
(Dec. 20, 2014), http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Natan_Sharansky 
[https://perma.cc/8XUM-SBAK]. 
74.  LEITER, supra note 17, at 11.  
75.  See id. 
76.  Waldron, supra note 17, at 85.   
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even this, Waldron argues, leaves ample berth for a government, 
through the coercive manipulation of a person’s intellectual 
environment, to determine what that person is likely to regard as 
true.77  By careful control over the material in a person’s 
“information feed”—over what a person is exposed to as well as 
what he is kept from, along with the prominence given to certain 
ideas, the spin with which they are presented, the repetition of 
themes, their reinforcement across different spheres (political, 
artistic, athletic, social, occupational), and so on—coercion can 
go a long way to inculcating specific notions.78  Waldron claims 
that any of a person’s particular beliefs results, in part, from a 
surrounding “epistemic apparatus.”79  The manipulation of this 
apparatus by means of interference with a person’s intellectual 
atmosphere will naturally affect the inferences that seem logical 
to him.  If, for example, a regime compels people to memorize a 
catechism or to read a scripture daily or to participate in certain 
religious rituals, this may well increase the number of people who 
come to affirm the associated doctrines.80  Certain outward 
displays of conformity to a belief, even if they are coerced, can, 
over time, encourage the adoption of that belief in earnest.  While 
a law requiring daily attendance at mass might not itself make you 
a believer, in other words, it could incline you in that direction. 
Waldron’s point is that indirectly, coercion can advance the 
sought results.81  Bear in mind, too, that even if a person comes 
to believe something under false pretenses (because he was 
systematically deprived of pertinent information, for instance), he 
believes it.  This, the critics claim, refutes the Lockean contention 
that conviction cannot be coerced.82  Much as we might wish it 
otherwise, canny manipulation by coercive means can achieve 
uniformity of belief.83 
 
77.  See id. at 81. 
78.  See id. 
79.  Id. at 82.  This is “the apparatus of selection, attention, concentration and so on – 
which, although it does not generate belief directly, nevertheless plays a sufficient role in its 
genesis to provide a point of leverage.”  Id. at 82.   
80.  Waldron, supra note 17, at 83-84. 
81.  Id. at 81. 
82.  Id. 
83.  For critical discussion of Waldron’s reasoning on this, see Darryl Wright, Reason, 
Force, and the Foundations of Politics, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF CAPITALISM: OBJECTIVISM 
AND ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES, AYN RAND SOCIETY PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES (Robert 
Mayhew & Gregory Salmieri eds.) (forthcoming) (manuscript at 44-54) (on file with author). 
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IV.  HOW THE CRITIQUE MISSES ITS MARK 
A. Force Impedes the Acquisition of Knowledge 
The critics’ charge holds a definite plausibility.  For under 
dictatorships that deny intellectual freedom, some constructive 
thought, some knowledge, and correspondingly, some production 
of material values do continue to take place.  Production does not 
grind to a halt.  Yet the Lockean position does not entail that it 
should; it does not deny the possibility of all such values.  What 
it challenges is a certain image of the relationship between these 
values.  In particular, it challenges the assumption that knowledge 
and the creation of values can occur independently of the freedom 
or restriction of individuals’ minds.84 
The Lockeans’ critics argue as if, because certain intellectual 
and material goods can exist in a society that stifles intellectual 
freedom, such freedom must be irrelevant.85  This is a stunningly 
superficial account of the situation, however.  While the 
combination of “freedom denied, goods supplied” might, at a 
quick glance, appear to refute the Lockean argument, this accepts 
the goods at face value without inquiring into their origins.  A 
simple question is critical:  how do people acquire these goods?  
By means of what activities and by virtue of what conditions?  
Can intellectual or material goods (literature, science, airplanes, 
smartphones, penicillin) be had under simply any conditions?  
Are they impervious to the freedom of men’s environment? 
Hardly. Witness the dramatically different standards of 
living in free and intellectually constricted nations.86  Witness the 
dearth of discoveries, inventions, and innovation that emerge 
from repressed societies.  How many new ideas—novel 
 
84.  By “values,” I mean those goods, material or spiritual, that objectively contribute 
to human well-being.  The concept thus encompasses such things as food, clothing, and 
medicine as well as knowledge, art, friendship, and self-esteem.  See AYN RAND, The 
Objectivist Ethics, in THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS: A NEW CONCEPT OF EGOISM 10, 16-19, 
25-27 (1964) [hereinafter RAND, The Objectivist Ethics]; LEONARD PEIKOFF, OBJECTIVISM: 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF AYN RAND 206-220, 241-249 (1991); TARA SMITH, VIABLE VALUES: 
A STUDY OF LIFE AS THE ROOT AND REWARD OF MORALITY 83-85 (2000); SMITH, THE 
VIRTUOUS EGOIST, supra note 29, at 19-32.  
85.  See Ruven Chu et al., Censorship & Freedom of Speech, STAN. COMPUTER SCI., 
https://cs.stanford.edu/people/eroberts/cs201/projects/communism-computing-
china/censorship.html [https://perma.cc/A4JM-VS5M]. 
86.  See United States vs. North Korea, INDEX MUNDI, 
http://www.indexmundi.com/factbook/compare/united-states.north-korea 
[https://perma.cc/QN4C-NDVX]. 
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techniques, innovative processes, and useful products based on 
these—are spawned by the inhabitants of obedience regimes?  
How many scientific discoveries have been achieved under the 
intellectual dictatorships of North Korea or Afghani theocrats?87  
How many patents were held by the residents of Pol Pot’s 
Cambodia?88  When entire areas of inquiry are legally forbidden, 
individuals’ minds are prevented from engaging with information 
that might be true and with ideas that might spark creative 
connections and the development of new knowledge.89 
Intellectually repressive regimes tend to lag in material well-
being by all the conventional measures of health, life expectancy, 
GNP, purchasing power, product quality, standard of living.90  
Numerous economic studies make plain the material fruits of 
freedom.91  While these studies primarily measure the effects of 
economic freedom, rare is the regime that restricts economic 
freedom while respecting intellectual freedom.  Indeed, doing so 
would be counter-productive from the standpoint of the 
repressors.  For effective restriction of one requires restriction of 
the other.  As Rand’s work emphasizes, for human beings, the 
 
87.  See International Science Ranking, SCIMAGO J. & COUNTRY RANK, 
http://www.scimagojr.com/countryrank.php [https://perma.cc/BM4J-7HB4]. 
88.  See Dezan Shira, Cambodia Recognizes First Patent Application, ASEAN 
BRIEFING (Mar. 12, 2015) http://www.aseanbriefing.com/news/2015/03/12/cambodia-
recognizes-first-patent-application.html [https://perma.cc/2XT6-YQBN]. 
89.  See Innovation in the Arab World: From Zero to Not Much More, THE 
ECONOMIST, June 4, 2016, at 42. 
90.  See Matthew Nitch Smith, The 17 Countries with the Worst Quality of Life in the 
World, BUS. INSIDER (July 1, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/social-progress-index-
countries-with-the-worst-quality-of-life-2016-7 [https://perma.cc/R2JF-BUKG]. 
91.  See Economic Freedom Report, FRASER INST., http://www.freetheworld.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/2UEN-FB9Z]; Economic Freedom Report: The Relationship Between 
Economic Freedom and Economic Well-Being, FRASER INST., 
http://www.freetheworld.com/efna/3EFNAch3.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9SZ-FT2X] 
(summary essay on the link between economic freedom and economic well-being); 2016 
Index of Economic Freedom, HERITAGE FOUND., http://www.heritage.org/index/ 
[https://perma.cc/6RCK-2X9K]; Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity, CATO INST., 
http://www.cato.org/centers/center-global-liberty-prosperity [https://perma.cc/Z2CY-
UUQ3]; Dan Mitchell, The Amazing Hockey Stick of Economic Progress, INT’L LIBERTY 
(June 27, 2014), https://danieljmitchell.wordpress.com/2014/06/27/the-amazing-hockey-
stick-of-economic-progress/ [https://perma.cc/Y89N-E32Y] (famous “hockey stick graph” 
of material growth resulting from greater freedom); Marginal Revolution Univ., The Hockey 
Stick of Human Prosperity, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t9FSnvtcEbg 
[https://perma.cc/7ELU-76R9]; Angus Maddison, The Contours of World Development, THE 
WORLD ECON. (May 17, 2010), https://sites.google.com/site/econgeodata/maddison-data-
on-population-gdp [https://perma.cc/9XFY-3VLV] (original underlying research of 
economist Angus Maddison). 
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creation of any goods requires a process of thinking:  identifying 
the relevant needs, adopting specific aims so as to meet them, and 
devising suitable means of achieving those aims.92  “[E]verything 
man needs has to be discovered by his mind and produced by his 
effort,” she writes.93  “Production is the application of reason to 
the problem of survival.”94 
Don Watkins and Yaron Brook describe the “production of 
wealth [as] fundamentally an intellectual project.”95  Wealth 
creation must be, in its inception, knowledge creation.96  As the 
economist Deirdre McCloskey puts it, “Our riches were not made 
by piling brick upon brick . . .  but by piling idea upon idea.”97  
Nobel laureate Amartya Sen has long been demonstrating that 
material well-being does not depend on economic freedom 
alone.98  Sen considers what he calls political freedoms as “among 
the constituent components” of economic development.99  
Freedom of thought is part and parcel of the ability to devise new 
products, new techniques, and new means of trade.  
Consequently, for dictators to restrict people’s intellectual 
activities while leaving free their economic activities, in hopes of 
material prosperity, would be a doomed enterprise.  The 
starvation of the mind necessarily constricts the products of the 
mind.  By the same token, for dictators to restrict people’s 
 
92.  See AYN RAND, What is Capitalism?, in CAPITALISM: THE UNKNOWN IDEAL 11, 
16-17 (1967) [hereinafter RAND, What is Capitalism?]; RAND, The Objectivist Ethics, supra 
note 84, at 22-24.  Rand illustrates this theme dramatically across her novel ATLAS 
SHRUGGED (1957).  See generally AYN RAND, ATLAS SHRUGGED (1957) (describing the 
necessity of freedom for man to pursue his highest potential and the society that best enables 
him to do so). 
93.  See RAND, What is Capitalism?, supra note 92, at 17.  
94.  Id.  
95.  DON WATKINS & YARON BROOK, EQUAL IS UNFAIR: AMERICA’S MISGUIDED 
FIGHT AGAINST INCOME INEQUALITY 90, 102-103 (2016). 
96.  Id. 
97.  Deirdre McCloskey, How Piketty Misses the Point, CATO POL’Y REP. (July/Aug. 
2015), https://www.cato.org/policy-report/julyaugust-2015/how-piketty-misses-point 
[https://perma.cc/BY93-DJNP].  For extensive elaboration, see generally Deirdre Nansen 
McCloskey, Bourgeois Equality: How Ideas, Not Capital or Institutions, Enriched the 
World, in 3 THE BOURGEOIS ERA (2016) (arguing that people across the world are richer 
than at any point in human history because of ideas and economic competition). 
98.  AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 5 (1999). 
99.   Id.  Sen counts as political freedoms “liberty of political participation and dissent,” 
“free speech and elections,” “democratic arrangements” such as “a multiparty democracy 
with elections and free media,” and freedom of “public discussion and participatory political 
decisions.”  Id. at 5, 11, 51-52, 123.  For his definitions of specific types of freedom, see id. 
at 38-40. 
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economic activities while leaving free their intellectual activities 
would court rebellion, since intellectually free people will be 
likely to realize how much better their material conditions could 
be. 
The point is, the kind of “repeat after me” society created by 
intellectual repression is not conducive to breakthroughs that 
advance knowledge or to innovations that improve people’s lives.  
Obviously, intellectual repression does not cause the immediate 
annihilation of all life-enhancing values.  People can still get by 
when their range of thought is restricted.  The problem is that they 
cannot prosper.100  They can produce only to the extent that they 
rely on the knowledge that freer minds had previously acquired; 
they are reduced to the position of parasites.101  While those who 
are restricted may be able to coast on the knowledge of others for 
a while, the straitjacketing of their minds means that they will not 
be able to generate any further knowledge.  “Intellectual go-
along” can take these people only as far as the minds of the rulers 
who set the boundaries concerning which ideas will and will not 
be permitted.102 
It is also significant that even people’s understanding of 
things that had previously been discovered will atrophy if they are 
not permitted robust and skeptical engagement with that 
knowledge.  A person must grasp the basis for a claim, at least in 
rudimentary terms, in order for it to have the status of knowledge 
in his mind.  As simple a claim as that water is H2O is meaningless 
in the mind of a person who has no comprehension of chemical 
elements.  Indeed, it is people’s re-thinking of accepted ways and 
beliefs that frequently prompts better ideas—corrections, 
 
100.  For Rand’s remarks on this, see AYN RAND, AYN RAND ANSWERS: THE BEST 
OF HER Q&A 32-34 (Robert Mayhew ed., 2005) [hereinafter RAND, THE BEST OF HER 
Q&A].  Bear in mind that these were made in spontaneous response to oral questions. 
101.  People who do not think “can survive only by imitating and repeating a routine 
of work discovered by others—but those others had to discover it, or none would have 
survived.”  RAND, What is Capitalism, supra note 92, at 17.  While the context of this 
statement was people who willfully refuse to think, the point applies equally to those who 
are forcibly prevented from thinking.  Non-thinkers’ survival is made possible by those who 
are free to discover the knowledge that the satisfaction of their needs requires.  See RAND, 
The Objectivist Ethics, supra note 84, at 19-20. 
102.  Wright discusses the comparable impairment of literary work, particularly 
drawing on the reflections of Polish author Czeslaw Milosz.  Wright, supra note 83, at 63.  
Censored writers may continue to generate output, but “[w]hat is impeded is the ability to 
write fluidly, authentically and insightfully.”  Id. at 64.   
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refinements, extensions, fresh applications.  This is how 
knowledge advances.  More on this, later. 
Let us return from this probing of intellectual freedom more 
directly to the dispute between Lockeans and their detractors.  
The thrust of the critics’ charge is that repression works.103  
Contrary to Lockean assertions of coercive instruments’ 
impotence to alter people’s beliefs, Leiter and Waldron maintain 
that dictators successfully use such means to accomplish exactly 
what they want.104  It is crucial to ask, however, repression 
“works” to accomplish what, precisely?  Coercion certainly can 
deliver the obedience that a dictator wants.  If some dictators do 
not care what the masses believe but simply want certain conduct, 
force can achieve that.  It cannot alter belief, however, according 
to the Lockeans, and this is what they find problematic.105  While 
they recognize that physical force can compel physical 
compliance, outward conformity with a dictators’ demands does 
not necessarily signify genuine conviction.  You cannot “get 
religion” via cattle-prod.  In this, I think, the Lockeans are leading 
us to a significant truth.  They do not grasp it fully, however, as 
we shall see. 
Undeniably, as Leiter and Waldron point out, through the 
systematic dissemination of propaganda and tight control over the 
thoughts and theories that people are permitted to be aware of, 
repressors can lead people to accept false conclusions.106  
Forcible restrictions can limit the materials that are available for 
a person to consider as well as the incentives that he has to 
entertain various lines of thought (incentives posed by the 
punishments attached to deviation from the state-approved 
orthodoxy).  Such manipulation of the intellectual environment 
will naturally influence the conclusions that people draw, even if 
they are scrupulously rational with the material they are fed.  Yet 
none of this touches the heart of the Lockean claim, which 
concerns the nature of rational thought. 
What the critics regard as the censors’ “success” rests in the 
fact that some of their victims do end up believing the censors’ 
desired conclusions as a result of the regime’s deliberate 
 
103.  LEITER, supra note 17, at 10-11. 
104.  Id.; Waldron, supra note 17, at 81.  
105.  See LEITER, supra note 17, at 10-11. 
106.  Id.  
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distortions.107  Even this is not precisely what the Lockeans 
dispute, however.  The problem, as the Lockeans see it, is that 
these people will embrace false ideas.108  One does not need to 
agree about the truth of a particular religious doctrine to 
appreciate that they are on to an important epistemological fact.  
This is where Rand takes their insight further.  By examining 
more closely the necessary conditions of rational thought and 
knowledge, she deepens and fortifies the Lockean line. 
Rand explains that “[a] rational mind does not work under 
compulsion.”109  A human mind cannot function cognitively—in 
a way that enables it to understand a phenomenon, to know 
reality—while it is bound by the standing order to affirm what the 
dictators decree.  By demanding that a person act against his own 
judgment, “[f]orce invalidates and paralyzes” his capacity for 
judgment; it renders it moot.110  Yet while a person’s mind “may 
be hampered by others, . . . silenced, proscribed, imprisoned,” 
Rand observes, “it cannot be forced; a gun is not an argument.”111 
To be still more precise, a mind cannot be forced to 
understand a particular argument or to know a particular 
conclusion.  It cannot be forced to do the kinds of things that a 
human mind uniquely can. 
Those who manipulate an intellectual environment can 
foster people’s assent to the manipulators’ specific goals.  That is 
not the same as fostering rational inquiry, however. And rational 
inquiry is the only path to genuine knowledge (concerning god or 
any subject).  The laws of a censor cannot compel a person’s 
inferences to be logical or his conclusions to be valid.  They 
cannot force a person to think in the way that generates 
knowledge, that brings awareness of reality.  Therein rests its 
ultimate bankruptcy.112 
 
107.  See LEITER, supra note 17, at 10-11. 
108.  See LORD KING, THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOHN LOCKE 364 (1884) (discussing 
what the Lockeans regard as false, that is, given their own beliefs about religious truth).  Not 
all those who I have dubbed “Lockeans” shared the same faith, but they did each hold definite 
views concerning what constitutes religious truth. 
109.  RAND, What is Capitalism?, supra note 92, at 17, 23.  
110.  Id. at 2; see also PEIKOFF, supra note 84, at 313.   
111.  RAND, What is Capitalism?, supra note 92, at 17.  
112.  Recent testimony of this comes from a victim of such intellectual repression.  See 
generally Fang Lizhi, The Most Wanted Man in China: My Journey from Scientist to Enemy 
of the State (Perry Link trans., 2016) (Fang Lizhi describing the intellectual repression he 
faced as a scientist in China).  His book’s theme is the “fundamental incompatibility between 
science and the kind of faith in their own infallibility demanded by China’s leaders.”  Richard 
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John Stuart Mill offered a famous defense of intellectual 
freedom that touches on some kindred claims.113  While Mill’s 
aim was to defend the political freedom of thought, his 
observations also address the basic conditions that are necessary 
for knowledge.114 
Even true ideas will deteriorate, Mill reasoned, in the minds 
of people who are not accustomed to challenging them.115  If a 
person does not understand the grounds of an idea, that which 
makes it true, it will sit as a mere prejudice or superstition in his 
mind.  Moreover, “[h]e who knows only his own side of the case, 
knows little of that,” Mill observes.116  A person can only 
rationally assess the merits of competing views when he grapples 
with opposing positions and understands the arguments beneath 
them.117  The upshot is, the acquisition of knowledge depends on 
unrestricted access to ideas and unrestricted engagement with 
them.  This is exactly what intellectual repression expunges. 
1. The Process, Not the Conclusion 
While recognizing the limited things that force can 
accomplish, the Lockeans’ focus on what force cannot deliver 
helps us to recognize how destructive it is.  To understand the 
correlative value of intellectual freedom more fully, we need to 
investigate the mechanics of human thought more closely.  What 
follows is an attempt to elaborate Rand’s account at a more fine-
grained level.118  From the outset, bear in mind that thinking is 
not an end in itself, but serves a definite purpose—namely, the 
acquisition of knowledge.  Knowledge, in turn, is valuable in 
order to inform action—to guide human beings to the kinds of 
actions that can advance our well-being.  The process by which a 
 
Bernstein, ‘The Most Wanted Man in China’ and ‘The Cowshed’, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/21/books/review/the-most-wanted-man-in-china-
and-the-cowshed.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/Q76V-RXDK].  
113.  See JOHN STUART MILL, On the Liberty of Thought and Discussion, in ON 
LIBERTY 86-95 (David Browmwich & Gorge Kateb eds., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1859). 
114.  See id. at 86.  While Mill and Rand are sometimes classified together as 
“libertarians,” my invoking Mill here should not be taken to suggest any deep affinities 
between his and Rand’s political thought.  Rand had several serious differences with Mill 
concerning utilitarianism and individual rights, among other things.  
115.  Id. at 102. 
116.  Id. at 104.  
117.  Id. at 104-05. 
118.  Peikoff and Wright provide good analysis of the impact of physical force.  See 
PEIKOFF, supra note 84, at 310-23; Wright, supra note 83, at 1-2.  
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person forms conclusions determines whether or not he is able to 
do that. 
In assessing any defense of religious freedom, therefore, it 
would be a mistake to focus on the value of religion or on the 
value of one particular religion versus another (such as 
Anglicanism versus Catholicism).  Rather, we should consider 
how a person comes to his religious belief.  What are the sorts of 
things that a person does as a means of reaching a religious 
conviction?  While the exact steps vary in different cases, 
typically, he will engage in some assortment of the following:  he 
thinks; he prays; he observes others; he emulates others in certain 
respects; he talks to others about their religious beliefs; he reads 
the doctrines and arguments of a particular religion or he reads 
about a religion—some of its history, its detractors’ criticisms.  
However extended or abbreviated a given person’s process, 
however deep or shallow, systematic or casual, ultimately, he 
makes up his mind.  He decides whether to learn more about other 
people’s beliefs or whether to “try out” alternative religions.  He 
decides whether he will continue to participate in the rituals that 
he practiced as a child or whether to suspend all religious belief 
or all interest in finding answers to the kinds of questions that 
religion characteristically addresses (questions about mortality, 
meaning, value, etc.).  The point is, a person thinks in order to 
embrace whatever religious views he does have.  Even if a 
particular person’s thinking is minimal or relatively un-
inquisitive, it is he who chooses to follow a given path.  What is 
significant for us is that religion represents a conclusion.  A 
person must be free in order to be able to investigate the relevant 
evidence and draw that conclusion rationally. 
Ultimately, a person must be free in order to reach valid 
conclusions—the rational, reality-hugging conclusions that 
enable him to understand the world around him, to act on that 
basis, and thereby advance his well-being.  Such freedom 
naturally brings with it the opportunity to think irrationally and to 
make poor decisions.  The immediate point, however, is that it is 
not the sanctity of any particular conclusion that underwrites the 
value of religious freedom.  Rather, it is the process by which 
human beings reach conclusions and can attain the understanding 
of the world that their well-being depends on.  Freedom of the 
mind is indispensable to that process.  This is the foundation of 
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intellectual freedom’s value—and correlatively, of religious 
freedom’s value. 
2. How Force Obstructs Rational Thinking 
Consider:  What does thinking consist of?  What is required 
to reach a conclusion and what is required to reach it rationally—
in a way that can yield knowledge?  Milton’s observation that 
“reason is but choosing” captures a crucial part of the answer.119 
A process of thinking involves confronting a series of 
choices.  To think about whether some proposition is true, a 
person must choose between ever-shifting arrays of alternatives 
that his mind lobs up to him—including those as basic as what 
thoughts to attend to.  He must decide which thoughts, of the 
many that might occur to him, to consider further and which to 
set aside; which to consider the relevance of and, if he deems 
some relevant, which to assign credence to.  To do this, in turn, 
he must determine how to assess the relevance and credence of 
each idea. 
Further, he must figure out what weight to assign to those 
ideas that he does regard as true.  What is their probative 
significance?  How strongly do they support a particular 
conclusion?  He must also consider the implications of various 
possible answers for the issue at hand and for other beliefs about 
other issues.  If this conclusion about this presidential candidate 
is valid, for instance, am I logically compelled to revise my 
previous conclusions about his overall merit or about who to vote 
for?  Or about whether to vote at all, this year? 
Let us take a fairly commonplace example by which to 
examine thought more closely.  Consider an eighteen year-old 
confronting the following question:  Should I attend this 
university or one of the other two that has accepted me?  What 
are some of the sub-questions he would need to answer, to answer 
that?  A barrage of questions will need his attention. 
How expensive would it be to attend that school?  What is 
the financial aid package?  How much debt can I afford to take 
on?  How much wage-earning work can I handle while in school?  
When would I be able to pay off the accumulated debt?  What are 
some realistic timetables?  To what extent would the pay offered 
by a job after graduation have to become a primary concern in 
 
119.  Milton, supra note 36, at 25.  
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deciding whether to take a job?  What are the odds that I could 
land jobs that would deliver the needed pay-scale?  How much 
pressure would that much debt create?  Is it worth it? 
What are my job prospects, holding a degree from that 
school?  How much do I care about those?  How much should I 
care about those?  Should that be the deciding factor—my 
likelihood of securing a sufficiently remunerative job immediately 
after graduating?  What about a job that is rewarding in other 
respects?  Which other respects? 
What is the school’s environment like, the quality of life that 
I can expect?  Is its strength in literature but its weakness in so 
many other areas a problem if I decide to abandon literature and 
change majors?  Is the school’s large size a plus or a minus?  Are 
the benefits of its broad range of courses, people, and 
extracurricular activities offset by the danger of feeling 
overwhelmed or anonymous at such a large institution?  What 
about those frigid winters?  What about its distance from an 
airport, for when I need to go home?  How much should those 
things affect my decision? 
Obviously, parallel questions will arise for the other schools.  
Further, a person might wonder:  Should I postpone starting 
school and re-apply next year?  Should I really go to a university 
at all?  Is this a better option for me than working in Uncle Joe’s 
company?  Or than joining the Marines, which has worked out so 
well for my cousin? 
The above is easily twenty-plus questions, generated without 
venturing beyond the most obvious.  One might object that I over-
complicate issues.  After all, most of us engage in this kind of 
thinking quite routinely and less laboriously.  My point, though, 
is that however attentive or deliberate a person might be, thinking 
largely consists of addressing a cascade of intellectual 
intersections, a sprawling network of questions demanding 
answers, and answers spawning additional questions.  The 
number and complexity obviously depend on the primary issue.  
“Pepper on your salad?” does not normally warrant extended 
analysis.  “Should I marry her?” normally does.  What is 
important for understanding the value of religious freedom (and 
wider intellectual freedom) is the fact that these choices can only 
be made rationally if the roads to logical answers are 
unobstructed.  If, instead, a person lives under a repressive regime 
in which evidence is withheld, “truth” is dictated, and permitted 
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conclusions are strictly controlled, his process of thinking is 
short-circuited, stymied by No Go zones, regions of cognitive 
activity declared Off Limits. 
To return to the person choosing a school, suppose his 
government denies people information about specific schools or 
fields of study that it deems threatening.  This means that his 
thinking about his principal question and its numerous offshoots 
must be diverted to thinking about the consequences of his 
pursuing what he deems the logical course.  That is, if he 
continues to explore the principal question as his judgment sees 
fit, he will be penalized. He must now consider the penalties 
attached to his course—penalties that have nothing to do with the 
nature of the alternatives (the schools, their programs, costs, etc.) 
and everything to do with the rulers’ wishes.  Absent the 
government restrictions, he is able to assess the issue on its merits.  
With them, he must assess it on the basis of the external penalties 
he will suffer if he reaches conclusions that the authorities 
disapprove of. 
Simply put, force is a game-changer.  The threat of coercion 
changes the subject.  It diverts a person from thinking about the 
best answer to a substantive question by evidence and logic to 
calculating, instead, what penalties would be imposed if I 
conclude a or b or c?  How likely am I to suffer those penalties?  
How severe are they?  Are they worth risking?  This is a 
completely different set of questions, the pursuit of which does 
not advance him at all on finding the logical answer to his original 
question (be it about schooling, religion, or anything else).  The 
investigation of those is sidetracked, at best, burdened by the 
imposition of this new cascade of questions, the answers to which 
tell him nothing about the merits of one school—or one religion—
versus another. 
In short, laws that deny intellectual freedom pre-empt a 
person’s ability to reach conclusions about an issue rationally—
by the relevant evidence and logic.  For the threat to punish 
deviant thoughts does not offer reasons why one conclusion is 
more sound than another.  It does not illuminate the actual 
character of the alternatives.  By attaching penalties to particular 
lanes of thought, such laws simply impose arbitrary barriers 
(arbitrary, insofar as they bear no relation to the logic of 
alternative conclusions about the substantive question). 
Consider two kinds of propositions: 
970 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol.  69:943 
(1) If you do x, it will be bad for you because of the 
nature of x (e.g., If you maintain that diet, you are likely 
to suffer from heart disease). 
(2) If you do x, it will be bad for you because we will 
punish you (e.g., If you maintain that diet, we will fine 
you). 
Laws repressing religious freedom are of the second type.  In the 
minds of those subject to them, their commands will stand as 
random roadblocks to reasoning about the issue.  The restricted 
person is given no evidence to consider and no arguments to 
examine.  For the purposes of rationally answering a substantive 
question (What should my religious views be?), they are useless.  
Indeed, Rand claims that they are worse than useless120 because 
such arbitrary imperatives impose barriers to cognition.121  Since 
the victim is given no reason to believe these state-ordained ideas 
but only reason to obey the attendant orders, they will paralyze 
his ability to proceed rationally.  Proceeding rationally, as we 
have seen, would require interrogating the truth of premises, 
examining their logical implications, identifying the relationships 
between one hypothesis and other hypotheses and conclusions, 
and so on.  When ideas are presented to a person not as entrants 
in the enterprise of rational examination of an issue but as edicts 
that stand on force, however, they will function in the mind as red 
lights—Stops!— to the logical progression of thought.122 
To be clear, Rand’s claim is not that laws that deny 
intellectual freedom render a person incapable of all rational 
thought.123  They render him incapable of proceeding rationally 
within the sphere of compliance.  That is, they make it impossible 
for him to proceed in a way that at once complies with the 
arbitrary demand and that follows the rational course that can lead 
to knowledge on the relevant question.  For he must continually 
second-guess his mind’s rational inferences:  But will this please 
 
120.  PEIKOFF, supra note 84, at 316. 
121.  See RAND, What is Capitalism?, supra note 92, at 17, 23; PEIKOFF, supra note 
84, at 313. 
122.  Yet another way to frame the difference: “Do as he says” and “Be rational” issue 
very different kinds of instructions.  When a law commands you to “Do as we say” simply 
because we say it and we will hurt you if you do not (rather than because that law is rationally 
justified by the proper mission of government), that command is incompatible with the 
direction to be rational.   
123.  See RAND, What is Capitalism?, supra note 92, at 17. 
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the authorities?  Will this step satisfy them, or might it appear a 
sign of my insubordination?  Might it lead me to another 
inference that would upset them?  If so, should I really continue 
along that line of thought?  Appeasing those in power becomes 
the paramount concern, since their disfavor could quash all of a 
person’s plans.  It is in this way that intellectual repression thwarts 
the use of reason and obstructs the acquisition of knowledge.124 
B. No “Interviews With the Gods”: The First 
Amendment and the Function of Government 
Because many defenders of religious freedom invoke the 
First Amendment as its foundation, it is important to understand 
how the Amendment relates to the Lockean line of defense.  Far 
from its serving to privilege religion, the full context reveals that 
the Amendment’s treatment of religion is perfectly consonant 
with Lockean reasoning.  The Founders established a deliberately 
secular government.125  They did so based on the same 
appreciation of the importance of mind freedom (rather than 
religion-specific freedom) that flows out of the Lockean insight.  
Ultimately, this discussion should thus reinforce our appreciation 
that the propriety of religious freedom does not rely upon any 
special value of religion.126 
In the American legal system, freedom of religion stands on 
the conviction that religious belief falls beyond the scope of a 
government’s legitimate authority.  The premise beneath the First 
 
124.  Other sources further explain the difference between engaging with a question 
when free and when under coercive threat of penalties.  See TARA SMITH, MORAL RIGHTS 
AND POLITICAL FREEDOM 143-155 (1995) [hereinafter SMITH, MORAL RIGHTS]; TARA 
SMITH, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AN OBJECTIVE LEGAL SYSTEM 99-105 (2015) [hereinafter 
SMITH, JUDICIAL REVIEW]; PEIKOFF, supra note 84, at 310-323.  Wright offers an extended 
breakdown of Rand’s view of the relationship between force and the human mind.  Wright, 
supra note 83, at 35-75; Darryl Wright, “A Human Society”: Rand’s Social Philosophy, in 
A Companion to Ayn Rand 235-37 (Allan Gotthelf & Gregory Salmieri eds., 2016).  Rand 
frequently discussed intellectual freedom.  See generally AYN RAND, PHILOSOPHY: WHO 
NEEDS IT 211-230 (1982) (discussing various views of Supreme Court justices on 
intellectual freedom).  See id. at 197-209 (discussing the problems associated with even 
minimal government censorship); AYN RAND, THE RETURN OF THE PRIMITIVE: THE ANTI-
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 176-78 (Peter Schwartz ed., 1999). 
125.  SUSAN JACOBY, FREETHINKERS: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN SECULARISM 5-6 
(2004).  
126.  None of what follows is to suggest that the Founders adhered to a single, uniform 
position on religious and intellectual freedom, nor that they had a fully developed 
understanding of such freedom’s philosophical foundations. What I present was, however, 
the overwhelmingly dominant view.  See KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 63, at 16.  
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Amendment is that a person’s ideas are of no concern to the 
government.127  Ideas as such—a person’s ideas about god or 
religion or his ideas about politics, morals, medicine, science, 
literature, leisure, the weather, whatever—are simply not 
germane to a government’s responsibilities.  Whether a given 
individual thinks, what he thinks about, and the conclusions he 
might reach alter not at all his status as a rights holder.  This is the 
sole concern of government:  what are the individual’s rights, and 
do a particular person’s actions interfere with the rights of others? 
The reason that we should separate church and state, in other 
words, is that a person’s religion makes no difference to the proper 
functioning of government.  The government has a specific, 
circumscribed mission:  the protection of individual rights.128  
People’s religious beliefs do not affect its ability to accomplish 
that mission.129  Madison affirmed as much when he wrote: 
A just Government instituted to secure & perpetuate 
[liberty] needs [ecclesiastical establishments] not.  Such a 
Government will be best supported by protecting every 
Citizen in the enjoyment of his Religion with the same equal 
hand which protects his person and his property; by neither 
 
127.  See Ben Clements, Note, Defining “Religion” in the First Amendment: A 
Functional Approach, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 532, 534 (1989). 
128.  See generally U.S. CONST. (the Constitution was created to “secure the Blessings 
of Liberty to ourselves . . .”); THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776) (outlining 
our inalienable rights including “Liberty”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 78 (James Madison).  
See also RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY 47 (2004) (discussing the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause); RANDY 
E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE LIBERTY AND 
SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE 167-68 (2016) (discussing the purpose of the 
Constitution); TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, THE CONSCIENCE OF THE CONSTITUTION: THE 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND THE RIGHT TO LIBERTY 12-13 (2014) (discussing 
Jefferson’s and Madison’s views on the need to protect individual liberty); SCOTT DOUGLAS 
GERBER, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 6 (1995) (discussing that, according to Jefferson, the 
Constitution should be interpreted to protect natural rights); KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra 
note 63, at 73 (discussing that Locke argued that the function of government is to protect 
liberty).  As Evan Bernick puts it, notwithstanding their other differences, “[the Framers] 
shared the same fundamental understanding of the proper function of government.  For the 
Framers, as for Locke, government was a means of protecting the natural rights of the 
individual ‘to dispose, and order as he lists, his person, actions, possessions, and his whole 
property.’”  Bernick, supra note 56, at 21.  
129.  Function is central to the structure and operations of a proper legal system.  See 
SMITH, JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 124, at 257. 
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invading the equal rights of any Sect, nor suffering any Sect 
to invade those of another.130 
Accordingly, Madison held, “‘the equal right of every citizen 
to the free exercise of his Religion according to the dictates of 
conscience’ is held by the same tenure with all our other 
rights.”131  Note that the importance of religion (either actual or 
perceived) gives it no greater weight among legal considerations.  
Jefferson similarly held that a person’s religious views should 
neither expand nor shrink his legal freedom.132 
All of this fits perfectly with the Lockean conception of force 
and of government (not surprisingly, since Locke’s writings were 
a primary influence on the Founders).133  According to Locke, 
“the business of Laws is not to provide for the Truth of Opinions, 
but for the Safety and Security of the Commonwealth, and of 
every particular mans [sic] Goods and Person.”134  Men contract 
to obey civil authority not to be told “what to believe or how to 
pray but simply for it to keep the peace.”135  While a person may 
“employ as many Exhortations and Arguments as he pleases, 
towards the promoting of another man’s Salvation,” on Locke’s 
view, “Force and Compulsion are to be forborne.”136  Every man 
“has the supreme and absolute Authority of judging for himself.  
And the Reason is, because no body else is concerned in it, nor 
can receive any prejudice from his Conduct therein.”137  As the 
influential thinker Joseph Priestley asked, “How is any person 
injured by my holding religious opinions which he disapproves 
of?”138  The state should be involved only if I threaten my 
 
        130.  Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 47. 
131.  Id.  
132.  Jefferson, observing that “opinion[s] in matters of religion . . . shall in no wise 
diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities.”  Thomas Jefferson and the Virginia Statute 
for Religious Freedom, VA. HIST. SOC’Y, http://www.vahistorical.org/collections-and-
resources/virginia-history-explorer/thomas-jefferson [https://perma.cc/EZ53-ELM9].   
133.  It was not only Locke’s political thought that was influential.  Locke’s arguments 
dominated eighteenth century views on epistemology and language.  “To the extent that 
Americans engaged in epistemological thought about language, including constitutional 
language, they began with the remarkable arguments in Locke’s Essay.”  Philip Hamburger, 
The Constitution’s Accommodation of Social Change, 88 MICH. L. REV. 239, 306 (1989).  
134.  LOCKE, CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 25, at 46.  
135.  KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 63, at 75 (characterizing the Lockean view).  
136.  LOCKE, CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 25, at 47.  
137.  Id.  
138.  KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 63, at 82.  Quote from Priestley, the British 
chemist who discovered oxygen, emigrated to America, and was a close friend of Franklin 
and Jefferson, exerting influence in the Founders’ intellectual circles.  Id. at 80-81.  
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neighbor’s “person, property or good name.”139  As Jefferson 
memorably put the thought, “The legitimate powers of 
government extend to such acts only as are injurious to others.  
But it does me no injury for my neighbor to say there are twenty 
gods, or no god.  It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg.”140 
In the same vein, Rand held that government should take no 
“judicial cognizance whatever of [a man’s] ideology.”141  As 
Leonard Peikoff explains her view, “The goal of a proper 
society . . . is not to compel truth or virtue (which would be a 
contradiction in terms), but to make them possible” by preserving 
individuals’ freedom.142 
The point is, the Lockean view that the function of 
government is the protection of individual rights—a view that 
was constitutionally enacted by the American Founders—is a 
logical outgrowth of recognition of the impotence of physical 
instruments to achieve intellectual ends.  (Handcuffs, pistols, and 
prisons cannot assist cognitive functioning.)  What Rand brought 
out more fully is the reason why the function of government is 
limited to the protection of individual rights, namely, the fact that 
man’s life requires freedom from force.143  That is, man’s material 
well-being depends on the exercise of reason—on his ability to 
engage in rational, knowledge-generating thought.  All those 
needs-satisfying goods that we spoke of earlier—everything from 
the most basic food and shelter to the most sophisticated medical, 
transportation, or communications devices—can only be had by 
means of logical inferences.  The requisite rational thought, in 
turn, requires the absence of physical force, as we detailed in the 
previous section, IV. A.  If a man is to be respected as entitled to 
seek to enjoy his life, he must be free of others’ forceful 
interference. 
For the purpose of understanding the value of religious 
freedom in relation to the First Amendment, it is significant that 
 
139.  Id.  
140.  THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS PROJECT: NOTES ON THE STATE 
OF VIRGINIA 176 (1781),  http://www.thefederalistpapers.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/12/Thomas-Jefferson-Notes-On-The-State-Of-Virginia.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WHQ5-WMDG].  
141.  AYN RAND, THE NEW LEFT: THE ANTI-INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 99 (1971).  
142.  PEIKOFF, supra note 84, at 367.  He adds that while “[a] proper government is 
based on a definite philosophy, [it may] play no role in promoting that philosophy.”  Id.  
143.  Ayn Rand, Man’s Rights, in CAPITALISM: THE UNKNOWN IDEAL 320, 322-28 
(1967) [hereinafter Rand, Man’s Rights]; PEIKOFF, supra note 84, at 310-23. 
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the Amendment does not solely address religion.144  Its concern 
is intellectual freedom, more broadly.  Each of its specified 
subjects—religion, speech, assembly, petition, and press—
involves the exercise of thought.145  As Onkar Ghate has 
observed, the now-familiar idea of the separation of church and 
state is actually a shorthand for the separation of state and 
ideas.146  The rationale for carving out this intellectual domain is, 
in the words of Jefferson, that “the legislative powers of 
government reach actions only, and not opinions.”147  The fact 
that Jefferson made this point in the course of discussing religious 
freedom testifies to his conviction that even religious freedom is 
simply one aspect of wider intellectual freedom.  Moreover, 
Jefferson held that whatever violates any aspect of the First 
Amendment “throws down the sanctuary which covers the 
others”—further evidence of his belief in the unity of the 
Amendment’s concerns.148  Indeed, it is on exactly this premise 
that U.S. courts have often resolved disputes ostensibly over 
freedom of religion by invoking the broader right of secular 
conscience.149 
The Founders’ regard for human intellect is well-known.  
Thomas Paine proclaimed, “The most formidable weapon against 
errors of every kind is Reason.”150  “My own mind is my own 
church.”151  Jefferson pledged “eternal hostility against every 
form of tyranny over the mind of man.”152  Madison urged that a 
 
144.  See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
145.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
146.  Onkar Ghate, A Wall of Separation Between Church and State: Understanding 
This Principle’s Supporting Argument and Far-Reaching Implications, in THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF CAPITALISM: OBJECTIVISM AND ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES, AYN RAND SOCIETY 
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES (Gregory Salmieri & Robert Mayhew eds.) (forthcoming 2017) 
(manuscript at 19) (on file with author). 
147.  Thomas Jefferson, A Wall of Separation, in THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND 
STATE 124, 130 (Forrest Church ed., 2004).  
148.  DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION 
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 63 (2002).   
149.  See W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943); U.S. v. Seeger, 
380 U.S. 163, 180, 186 (1965); Welsh v. U.S., 380 U.S. 333, 339 (1970) (concerning military 
conscription).  Warren Burger’s claim that freedom of association and freedom of expression 
are “two peas from the same pod” is another latter-day reflection of this holistic 
understanding of the First Amendment.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 244 (1976) (Burger, 
C.J., dissenting). 
150.  THOMAS PAINE, THE AGE OF REASON 3 (1794). 
151.  Id. at 6. 
152.  Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Dr. Benjamin Rush, September 23, 1800, U. OF 
GRONINGEN,   
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clause explicitly asserting the right to conscience be added to 
Article I of the Constitution, prior to any discussion of 
Amendments.153  The proposal was not adopted, according to 
some, only because it was considered a needless redundancy; the 
wider right to intellectual freedom was well-understood.154  The 
point is, this respect for intellectual activity helps to explain the 
First Amendment’s explicit protection of several of its forms.155 
If this much shows that the First Amendment was not 
designed to reflect any special reverence for religion,156 neither 
was the Founders’ conception of the authority of government 
wedded to theism.  Rather, as John Adams explained, the United 
States is a “government[] erected on the simple principles of 
nature.”157  Its architects never “had interviews with the gods or 
were in any degree under the inspiration of Heaven.”158  This is a 
government “founded on the natural authority of the people alone, 
without a pretense of miracle or mystery.”159  Correspondingly, 
 
http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/thomas-jefferson/letters-of-thomas-
jefferson/jefl134.php [https://perma.cc/ZVY4-TQNM].  Jefferson also famously advised, 
“Fix reason firmly in her seat, and call to her tribunal every fact, every opinion.  Question 
with boldness even the existence of a god; because, if there be one, he must more approve of 
the homage of reason, than that of blindfolded fear.”  Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Peter Carr 
Paris, Aug. 10, 1787, U. OF GRONINGEN,  
http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/thomas-jefferson/letters-of-thomas-
jefferson/jefl61.php [https://perma.cc/SGK2-BZ6V]. 
153.  BURT NEUBORNE, MADISON’S MUSIC: ON READING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
209 (2015). 
154.  Id. at 209-10.  The proposed clause read, “The civil rights of none shall be 
abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be 
established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any 
pretext, infringed.”  Id. at 209. 
155.  See generally Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment 
Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346 (2002) (arguing that the Framers were basically unified in 
their reasoning for separation of church and state on the grounds of liberty of conscience). 
156.  David Anderson has argued that in conceiving of the First Amendment, the 
Founders did not begin with a general theory of intellectual freedom, but rather, forged 
solutions to specific grievances as circumstances demanded (e.g., restrictions on the press).  
See David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 488 (1983); 
David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, in THE FIRST AMENDMENT, FREEDOM 
OF SPEECH: ITS CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 65, 72-74 
(Vikram David Amar ed., 2009).  As a matter of history, this may be correct.  If it is, however, 
their having come gradually to an increasingly robust understanding of intellectual freedom 
would not tell against the validity of the idea that intellectual freedom is a deeper and wider 
principle than religious freedom and that that is the essence of what they sought to safeguard 
in the First Amendment. 
157.  KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 63, at 41. 
158.  Id.  
159.  Id.  
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as Oliver Ellsworth160 encapsulated the reigning view, “The 
business of civil government is to protect the citizen in his 
rights . . . civil government has no business to meddle with the 
private opinions of the people . . . . Legislatures have no right to 
set up an inquisition and examine into the private opinions of 
men.”161 
The larger lesson for reconciling the First Amendment’s 
reference to religious freedom with the Locke-Rand line that I 
have defended is straightforward.  The Founders’ commitment to 
a secular government whose authority is limited by its specific 
function and their conception of the First Amendment as 
safeguarding intellectual freedom are entirely consonant with the 
Lockean thesis that coercion cannot compel conviction and that 
the exercise of reason requires freedom from force.  Even in the 
thinking of those who framed the First Amendment, the 
fundamental justification of religious freedom was not radiated 
by the value of religion.  Rather, religious devotion was 
recognized as merely one of myriad options that a person had for 
exercising his freedom.162  Inserting the word “religious” before 
the term “liberty” neither widens the scope of an individual’s 
rights nor shrinks the legal system’s responsibility to safeguard 
others’ rights.  “Religious liberty” designates one of the types of 
uses that a person might make of his rights—no more and no 
less.163 
The fact that a great number of people espouse religion and 
that it has at times exerted great influence over the fate of nations 
bestows on it no different value as the object of legal protection 
 
160.  TOM W. CAMPBELL, FOUR SCORE FORGOTTEN MEN: SKETCHES OF THE 
JUSTICES OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 95-99 (1950) (discussing that Ellsworth was a 
delegate to the Constitutional Convention, member of the first Congress, and briefly Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court). 
161.  KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 63, at 42.  
162.  This reflected the prevailing conception of rights.  “Both Federalists and Anti-
Federalists agreed that the rights of Americans were innumerable.  In particular, they agreed 
that they had countless natural rights . . . to eat, sleep, shave and do any number of other 
things of which human beings were capable . . . . ”  Philip A. Hamburger, Trivial Rights, 70 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 30 (1994).  
163.  It is crucial to understand that this concerns only the proper freedom of a person’s 
actions rather than the larger, “all things considered” moral character of his action.  It can be 
perfectly logical to condemn a person’s action as wrong or immoral, while affirming his right 
to take the action—that is, as something that the person should be free to do.  (It might be 
wrong to attend the Catholic mass, for example, or to drink alcohol or to watch pornographic 
film, but a person should be free to engage in these activities; the two are distinct questions.)  
See SMITH, MORAL RIGHTS, supra note 124, at 186.  
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than any of the less momentous ways that a person might exercise 
his freedom.  Without question, religion has exerted monumental 
influence in countless people’s lives.  Because of this, we tend to 
assume that it has special weight.  In certain respects, it does.  
From the perspective of a proper legal system, however—whose 
singular mission is the protection of individuals’ liberty—it does 
not.  For again, whether or not a person embraces a religion in 
itself makes no difference to his status as a bearer of rights—
either to the rights that he possesses or to his obligations to the 
rights of others.  If a person is inspired by religion to act in ways 
that threaten others’ rights, he is properly subject to government’s 
forcible restriction.  The justification of this is the person’s action, 
however, not his beliefs, since only actions can impinge on 
others’ rights. 
What the Founders understood and what Rand would 
especially emphasize is that the right to engage in a particular 
action (be it intellectual or physical) does not depend on the value 
of that action.164  Rather, it stems from the fact that a person’s life 
is his, morally, to lead as he likes.165  As long as he does not 
infringe on others’ rights, a man is entitled to do with it as he 
pleases.166  Religious laissez-faire is of a piece with economic 
laissez-faire.167  Consequently, one does not need to believe in the 
 
164.  Rand, Man’s Rights, supra note 143, at 321-22. 
165.  Id. 
166.  Rand writes, “Under a proper social system, a private individual is legally free to 
take any action he pleases (so long as he does not violate the rights of others) . . . .”  Ayn 
Rand, The Nature of Government, in CAPITALISM: THE UNKNOWN IDEAL 329, 331-32 
(1967).  Rand outlines her basic conception of rights in “Man’s Rights.”  Rand, Man’s Rights, 
supra note 143, at 322. 
167.  Recall the interplay between economic and intellectual freedom discussed in 
Section IV.A.  The Eighteenth Century Anglo-American conception of material and 
intellectual freedom united marketplace freedom, political freedom, and spiritual freedom.  
See KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra 63, at 70.  Rand understood the intimate connection 
between these types of freedom.  See AYN RAND, FOR THE NEW INTELLECTUAL: THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF AYN RAND 23 (1961) [hereinafter RAND, FOR THE NEW INTELLECTUAL] 
(“Intellectual freedom cannot exist without political freedom; political freedom cannot exist 
without economic freedom; a free mind and a free market are corollaries.”); PEIKOFF, supra 
note 84, at 353 (“Freedom is indivisible” and “There can be no right to think apart from the 
right to act.”); Id. at 313 (“Since man is an integrated being of mind and body, any attempt 
to force his mind necessarily represents an attempt to rule his actions and, vice versa.”); 
Onkar Ghate, “A Free Mind and a Free Market Are Corollaries”: Rand’s Philosophical 
Perspective on Capitalism, in A COMPANION TO AYN RAND 222-242 (Allan Gotthelf & 
Gregory Salmieri eds., 2016) explaining that regardless of whether a person wielding force 
demands that you surrender your wallet or that you accept a certain religious view, the 
fundamental demand for surrender of your judgment is the same.  On the importance of 
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value of religion to make sense of the First Amendment’s 
protection of religious liberty.  As both the historical and 
philosophical context make clear, religious freedom is not about 
religion.  The propriety of religious freedom stems, 
fundamentally, from the value of intellectual freedom.  The 
Lockeans’ recognition of the futility of force to deliver certain 
kinds of intellectual results, fortified by Rand’s more exact 
recognition that force obstructs rational thought and the 
acquisition of knowledge, is a major contribution to our 
understanding of this value.  Thus the First Amendment does not 
present an alternative to the Lockean defense of religious 
freedom.  When its context and rationale are properly understood, 
it is a logical manifestation of that defense 
C. A Forced Mind Is Not a Valuable Mind: Rand’s 
Development of the Lockean Line 
Having covered a good deal of territory, let us take stock. 
Where do things stand in the debate between Lockeans and their 
critics, and how do Rand’s views fit in? 
The critics contend that the Lockean argument fails to prove 
the futility of force for determining people’s beliefs.168  Through 
coercive if indirect means (such as by limiting people’s exposure 
to certain ideas or requiring their participation in certain 
activities), a government allegedly can manipulate people into 
forming desired conclusions.169  For the purpose of inculcating 
certain beliefs, the tools of state coercion are more potent than 
Lockeans allow. 
In this, the critics are correct, although the Lockeans do not 
deny force’s power to incentivize overt behavior.  What the first-
wave Lockeans and their critics both fail to appreciate, however, 
is that what is at stake is much more than people’s espousal of a 
particular creed, such as Anglicanism.  The problem is not that 
religion cannot be served by force, as Locke laments.170  The 
problem, on Rand’s analysis, is that force prevents the exercise of 
reason and the attainment of genuine knowledge about any 
 
intellectual freedom, see Darryl Wright, “A Human Society”: Rand’s Social Philosophy, in 
A COMPANION TO AYN RAND 217-37 (Allan Gotthelf & Gregory Salmieri eds., 2016). 
168.  Jennifer Biess, Locke’s Theory of Intolerance, 15 RES PUBLICA: J. 
UNDERGRADUATE RES. 1, 93-94 (2010). 
169.  LEITER, supra note 17, at 10-12; Waldron, supra note 17, at 61-64. 
170.  LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 25, at 47. 
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subject—religion, biology, physics, metaphysics, psychology, 
economics, human relationships—the gamut.171  Knowledge can 
only be had when a person’s thinking is, in its fundaments, 
evidence-based rather than force-decreed; when it is logic-guided 
rather than weapon-averting.  Dodging bullets is not the path to 
curing cancer. 
Even as the Lockean argument marks a real advance, then, it 
is at best transitional, pointing us to a previously under-
appreciated fact, yet still hamstrung by allegiance to particular 
conclusions.172  Locke’s own denial of religious freedom to 
Catholics and atheists reflects this failure to understand fully the 
basis for religious freedom (which would justify that freedom for 
everyone, not only those of a certain faith).173  Nonetheless, by 
exploring the roots of religious freedom in the nature of thought—
in the process of thinking—Lockeans lead us to consider the 
conditions necessary for all thinking, not only that concerning 
religion. 
I have argued that the content of what a person believes, 
whether religious or not, is immaterial to his right to religious 
freedom.  What the Lockeans glimpsed and what Rand 
appreciates more fully is that without freedom, a person would 
not be able to use his rational faculty as the rational faculty.174  
He would not be able to apply reason to all facets of reality, to all 
available information on a given subject and to all the thoughts 
that might be relevant to it.  When a person’s thinking is 
constricted by coercive penalties he will suffer if he raises that 
question or if he considers that evidence or if he presses that 
objection, he is permitted only to contemplate a subset of reality, 
the redacted version that the government approves.  This will 
hamper his ability to know things (to put it mildly). 
Rand’s contention is that a forced mind is not a valuable 
mind.175  It is valuable neither to its owner nor to the people 
 
171.  LEONARD PEIKOFF, THE OMINOUS PARALLELS: THE END OF FREEDOM IN 
AMERICA 336 (1982). 
172.  While some of the Lockeans were more wed to particular religious conclusions 
than were others, as a group, they did not fully grasp the relationship between force and 
rational thought.  
173.  Frederick C. Giffin, John Locke and Religious Toleration, 9 J. CHURCH & ST. 3, 
379-80, 84 (1967). 
174.  RAND, What is Capitalism?, supra note 92, at 322. 
175.  RAND, What is Capitalism?, supra note 92, at 11, 17, 23; RAND, The Objectivist 
Ethics, supra note 84, at 25-26; Rand, Man’s Rights, supra note 143, at 322. 
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around him—not as a human mind.  When the threat of force 
obstructs a person’s exercise of reason, it destroys that person’s 
prize feature—man’s “comparative advantage,” in the language 
of economists.176  Religious repressors may be correct that if you 
treat a man like a dog, you can get him to act like a dog; physical 
stings can train obedience.  Yet, you will reap no greater value 
than that: compliance with dictated orders.  The intellectual 
capacity of the forcers will limit the intellectual capacity of their 
victims.  Under intellectual repression, you will reap a society no 
more creative, no more inventive, no more clever or resourceful 
or innovative or insightful for battling the Zika virus or 
engineering a safer car or unleashing the powers of silicon than 
are the minds of the force-wielders.177  Their intellectual abilities 
set the ceiling on that society’s potential.178 
We might thus cast the difference between the original 
Lockeans and Rand as follows.  First-wave Lockeans claimed that 
a coerced belief cannot be authentic.  When adopted due to 
pressure from the magistrate’s sword, a person’s “conclusions” 
are not truly his.  (And this is the nub that the critics challenge.)  
Rand’s claim, by contrast, is that a coerced belief cannot be 
rational.  It cannot be a means of cognition.  For it cannot stand 
on a full logical reckoning with all the relevant evidence, but only 
with that portion of evidence that escapes the censors’ scissors.  
A person’s conclusion about a given topic might be rational 
within the narrow parameters of the information he is permitted 
to consider, but such a shrunken, distorted image of reality cannot 
yield knowledge of reality.  Yet that is what human well-being 
depends on.  No fact is extinguished by being misrepresented.  
Withholding information about Zika does not change what people 
need to know to avoid it or what researchers need to know to treat 
 
176.  Frank H. Easterbrook, Comparative Advantage and Antitrust Law, 75 CAL. L. 
REV. 983, 984 (1987). 
177.  See Trevor McAllister-Day, UW Researchers Make Progress Fighting Zika, THE 
DAILY OF THE U. OF WASH. (Oct. 11, 2016), 
http://www.dailyuw.com/science/biology_and_medicine/article_07863950-8e90-11e6-
98ab-03dc2962cbc9.html [https://perma.cc/SGR8-QUYF]; Ezra Dyer, Why Cars Are Safer 
Than They’ve Ever Been, POPULAR MECHANICS (Sept. 11, 2014), 
http://www.popularmechanics.com/cars/a11201/why-cars-are-safer-than-theyve-ever-been-
17194116/ [https://perma.cc/N4UM-8ERL]. 
178.  See RAND, FOR THE NEW INTELLECTUAL, supra note 167, at 134-35; RAND, The 
Objectivist Ethics, supra note 84, at 25-26; RAND, What is Capitalism?, supra note 92, at 
17. 
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it.  Whereas for Lockeans, then, it is salvation that requires a free 
mind, for Rand, it is life, humans’ ability to survive and flourish.  
Only a mind that is uninhibited by force in its pursuit of evidence 
and logic can answer the challenges that human well-being 
naturally presents. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Clashes between religiously inspired political ideologies as 
well as demands for religion-based exemptions from certain laws 
have, over the past several years, inflamed debates over religious 
freedom.  What is its meaning?  What is its scope?  My contention 
is that we cannot understand what religious freedom properly 
protects until we understand why it protects—its basic 
justification and its value.  The inadequacy of reigning accounts 
is evidenced by the ceaseless stream of precarious balancing acts 
that only temporarily quiet conflict. 
I have argued that an important line of support for religious 
freedom raised by John Locke, John Milton, and other 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century thinkers has been too 
casually dismissed by contemporary scholars.  While their 
analysis was far from perfect, the Lockeans advanced the debate 
over religious freedom to more fundamental and more instructive 
territory concerned with the very nature of rational thought.  What 
the Lockeans help us appreciate is that the propriety of religious 
freedom is not sui generis; it is not rooted in a distinct value of 
religion.179  Rather, it lies in the nature and needs of the human 
mind.  Building on the Lockeans’ advance, Ayn Rand has more 
recently argued that freedom is the precondition of man’s ability 
to exercise his rational faculty and, thereby, gain knowledge.  
Accordingly, the case for religious freedom is part of the deeper 
and wider case for intellectual freedom.  Its value stems from the 
value of a free mind.180 
The Lockeans argued that a government’s instruments of 
physical force cannot deliver intellectual results.  While a 
government can declare certain ideas to be true, impose penalties 
 
179.  This was not necessarily all of their intention, but it is the implication and the 
lesson of their arguments.  
180.  See SMITH, MORAL RIGHTS, supra note 124, at 52-52; Rand, Man’s Rights, supra 
note 143, at 320-33; PEIKOFF, supra note 84, at 311 (discussions of force); Wright, supra 
note 83, at 43-79.  
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for dissent, and thereby incentivize people to say what it wants 
them to say and to act as it wants them to act, it cannot, by these 
means, transform people into true believers.  What Rand adds, 
more exactly, is that physical tools cannot make those who are 
coerced rational believers.  Such methods cannot make a person 
understand that which reason shows. 
In the larger scheme of things, this is what most matters.  
Human life requires the satisfaction of certain needs; knowledge 
is required to be able to meet those needs.  If our ultimate aim is 
to advance human well-being, getting people to believe and act as 
a given government decrees does no good.  It might accomplish 
what particular rulers want, but that, in itself, has no objective 
value.181  Coerced intellectual conformity is not a viable route to 
progress. 
Why does this matter?  If we do not understand the basis of 
religious freedom, we will not understand its proper application—
exactly what the law should protect, in specific disputes.  The 
consequences redound to everyone, not only the religious.  
Misunderstandings of religious freedom reflect 
misunderstandings of freedom.  When “religious freedom” is 
warped to assume unwarranted dimensions, rightful freedom 
suffers.  An erroneous notion of religious freedom can only be 
respected by means that encroach on others, as other individuals 
are made to provide the time off, for instance, or to pay for the 
medical insurance or to lose the limbs in fighting the wars that 
religious citizens object to.  Some people’s freedom will be 
wrongly denied in order to accommodate the beliefs of the 
religious. 
Further, the repression of religion, by obstructing a person’s 
exercise of reason in the ways that we have examined, will 
naturally require wider repression and inflict wider damage.  
Ideas are interrelated.  Because an idea carries logical 
implications, the affirmation or rejection of any one idea 
inescapably carries implications concerning others—concerning 
their truth, their relevance on a given issue, their relative weight 
 
181.  It cannot make the rulers’ ideas true.  If some of them are true, it cannot make 
people understand those ideas.  And it cannot make beliefs that are adopted at the point of a 
gun (to avert force) rather than by means of independent inference a sound basis for 
individuals’ beliefs, for individuals’ actions, or for government policy. 
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in supporting or weakening other hypotheses, and so on.182  That 
the bridge is rickety entails that anyone concerned with safety 
should use it with caution.  That the daily consumption of red 
wine has this effect, that gun control has that effect, that the 
biopsy shows this quality, each conceivably carries consequential 
implications for other beliefs and sensible actions. 
Given the inherently relational character of ideas, for a 
government to enforce a particular religious creed (or any 
intellectual doctrine, for that matter) will require repressors to 
confine people much more tightly than we might initially 
suppose.  The study of geology can throw into question religious 
doctrines concerning the origin of the universe; the study of 
physics can throw into question religious doctrines concerning 
miracles or an afterlife.  Certain conclusions in biology or human 
psychology threaten religious doctrines about male-female 
relationships or marriage or women in the workplace or women 
driving cars. 
In short, to uphold a particular orthodoxy, it is not simply 
that the Catholic may not study the teachings of Calvin, for 
example.  He should not study anything that might threaten his 
embrace of the anointed orthodoxy.  Thus religious repression 
naturally bleeds into other areas.  Even if a regime’s laws 
officially address only inquiry concerning a specific religion, 
their effect will extend to encompass inquiry about related 
matters—and about matters related to those questions, and other 
matters related to those, and so on.  To be safe, the individual 
should avoid all such temptations and the state, if it is serious 
about its mandated orthodoxy, should not allow exposure to such 
temptations.183  On the repressors’ premise that some ideas must 
be accepted no matter what—regardless of what the evidence and 
logic indicate—the safest course is for the individual not to 
entertain any ideas in a dangerous neighborhood and for the state 
not to permit him to entertain such ideas. 
 
182.  On knowledge as interconnected, see AYN RAND, INTRODUCTION TO 
OBJECTIVIST EPISTEMOLOGY 10 (Harry Binswanger & Leonard Peikoff eds., 1979); 
PEIKOFF, supra note 84, at 121-41; HARRY BINSWANGER, HOW WE KNOW: EPISTEMOLOGY 
ON AN OBJECTIVIST FOUNDATION 194-95, 198 (2014); RAND, THE BEST OF HER Q&A, 
supra note 100, at 32-33.  
183.  It should limit the “occasion” of sin.  Lots of fruit on the tree of knowledge will 
have to be forbidden. 
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Policing the orthodox is full-time work.  For all manner of 
ideas stand to threaten it.  If religious repression is to be effective, 
its subject matter cannot be contained. 
The upshot is, religious beliefs are not the only casualty of 
religious repression.  Because such repression is, more 
fundamentally, an obstruction of the rationally functioning mind, 
it stifles all kinds of thinking about all kinds of subjects.  
Correspondingly, anyone who values rational inquiry and 
knowledge needs to understand the value of religious freedom.  
Only with an accurate grasp of its basis can we properly respect 
it and preserve that value—and, correspondingly, the value of all 
freedom. 
 
